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ABSTRACT
Security Operation Centers (SOCs) have become an integral component of business organi-
zations all over the world. The concept of a SOC has existed for a few years now yet there is no
systematic study documenting the occurrences of their operations. A lack of documented opera-
tional knowledge makes it a challenge for security researchers interested in improving operational
efficiency through algorithms, tools, and processes.
SOC environments operate under a secrecy culture as a result of which researchers are not
trusted by analysts and their managers. This lack of trust leads to only superficial information
through methods such as interviews. Moreover, security analysts perform their tasks using hunches
that are difficult to articulate and express to an interviewing researcher. This knowledge is called
tacit knowledge. Capturing rich tacit knowledge is crucial for researchers to build useful and usable
operational tools.
This thesis proposes use of long-term participant observation from cultural anthropology as
a research methodology for security researchers to study SOC analysts and their managers. Over a
period of four and a half years seven students in Computer Science, graduate and undergraduate,
were trained by an anthropologist in using fieldwork techniques to study humans. They then took
jobs as security analysts at five different SOCs belonging to academia and corporations.
We made unexpected discoveries in pursuit of tacit operational knowledge. The first discov-
ery was identification of human capital mismanagement of analysts as the root cause of analyst
burnout. Specifically, a vicious cycle among analyst skills, empowerment, creativity, and growth
causes analysts to lose morale and eventually leave the job. In fact burnout is a manifestation of
number of tensions that are inherent in a security operations setting. This leads to our second
discovery of recognizing and managing contradictions as a prerequisite for SOC innovation. Failure
to acknowledge them can lead to dysfunctions in a SOC such as analyst burnout. Informed by the
findings regarding the social aspects of SOC operations we attained the intended goal of captur-
vi
ing tacit operational knowledge. The thesis documents our experience in tacit knowledge capture
through design of a framework for detecting phishing emails in near real-time.
Studying human aspects of security operations and cyber-security in general must be done
within a social and organizational context. This thesis proposes long-term participant observation of
practitioners and end-users as a viable methodology to conduct cyber-security research in general.
vii
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
One of the main goals of security researchers is to design technologies for users to ensure safety
in the digital world. One of the best metrics for tool effectiveness is its usability by users. Most of
the work in usability of security technologies have focused on end user security and privacy. There
is a another group of end users that benefit from security research output. They play a key role
in ensuring organizational security and they are the security practitioners. These include Level-1
& 2 analysts, incident responders, and forensic investigators. Just as we have to study end users
to develop a useful tool one has to study the practitioners to understand their requirements and
constraints.
Studying practitioners, however, is hard for many reasons. A Security Operations Center
(SOC) is a place of high secrecy, making it hard for outsiders including researchers to talk to SOC
analysts. Methods such as interviews are challenging due to the nature of analysts’ job. A SOC
analyst works under high stress as they have to close hundreds of tickets every day and tend to
unexpected emergencies. A researcher interviewing analysts is often perceived as an interruption
from SOC’s point of view. In addition to the secrecy and high stress, the nature of knowledge held
by analysts makes expressing them to a researcher difficult. The decision making process of an
analyst is based on hunches, contextual knowledge, and years of experience that sometimes appear
to lack rationale. They seem to always know more then they can actually express to an interviewing
researcher. In order to understand operational knowledge one first needs to think about the nature
of human knowledge in general.
Michael Polanyi, a philosopher-scientist, famously alluded that humans “know more than
they can tell.” He conceptualized the term “tacit knowledge” to refer human knowledge that is
difficult to articulate and express. For example, people who can ride bicycle very well may not be
able to explain how they do it. A significant portion of security practitioners’ knowledge is tacit [1].
This has significant consequences to security technology development by the research community.
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One cannot improve analysts’ efficiency through tool development without an understanding of
their workflow. Thus it seems the only way to tap into security analysts’ tacit knowledge is by
working as analysts – in order to learn to ride a bicycle one has to start riding one.
In search of a suitable research methodology, cultural anthropology seemed to fit very well
with the research requirements [2]. Cultural anthropologists study indigenous population with the
goal of understanding their culture by obtaining a “native point of view.” Anthropologists refer to
this as taking an emic perspective where a researcher discards his bias and presuppositions about
the target population. The dominant approach used by an anthropologist in their study is long-term
participant observation, in which a researcher spends 2-4 years living within a community. Through
this process a researcher will be able to identify the meaning attached to cultural practices. They
try to understand the meaning behind symbols and spoken words.
A similar is approach is adopted in this work. An interdisciplinary research team that includes
myself conducted an anthropological study of analysts in SOC environments. One of the team
members is an anthropologist who trained seven students in Computer Science (CS) – graduate
and undergraduate – in participant observation methods. Over a period of 4.5 years (since 2013) the
student fieldworkers studied five different SOCs belonging to universities and corporations. They
took jobs as Level-1 and Level-2 analysts, forensic analysts, incident responders, and software
developers in various SOCs. Researchers (student fieldworkers) became analysts to attain the
native point of view of security operations. The nuances and hunches embodied in the practice of
security operations could then be accessed by fieldworkers. The tacit knowledge could then be used
to build useful tools that improve SOC operational efficiency. This was my vision and the entire
research team at the early stages of this research. However, we made some very interesting and
unexpected discoveries along our journey towards this goal.
The first discovery was the burnout phenomenon of security analysts leading to high-turnover.
Though this problem has been acknowledged to exist by security industry [3], the actual causes of
burnout in the context of SOCs have not been clearly understood. Through extensive analysis of
field notes I identified mismanagement of human capital in the SOC as a major cause of analyst
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burnout. Specifically, my analysts finds the following factors to be interlinked in maintaining a
healthy analysts workforce:
• Skill-set of analyst
• Empowerment of analyst by their management
• Creativity of analyst in their job
• Intellectual growth of an analyst through their job
A vicious cycle could form due to negative causality that starts from any of the four factors.
For example, a management can hire a low-skilled analyst due to limited budget and not empower
them to enough to do their job. The analyst might not have access to privileged services or accounts
because the manager does not trust his skills. As a result, the analyst gets stuck performing
repetitive tasks which leads to little to no intellectual growth. The absence of growth leads to
no accumulation of new skills which then leads to lower empowerment. The cycle thus continues
leading eventually to burnout of the analyst. Chapter 3 discusses in detail the model for burnout
of analysts and also provides recommendations to both management and analysts to remediate the
problem.
One of the suggestions provided by this thesis to mitigate analyst burnout and improve
operational efficiency is frequent automation of repetitive tasks. The student fieldworkers in fact
built a number of tools throughout their fieldwork that helped analysts focus on creative tasks by
automating away repetitive ones. To our surprise, automation through co-creation did not solve the
SOC inefficiency problem permanently. I performed extensive analysis of field notes to understand
why our proposed solution did not solve the SOC inefficiency problem. The analysis lead us to
second major discovery – the existence of multiple contradictions in a SOC environment.
The primary objective of a SOC analyst is to be creative in their job and mitigate security
threats targeted towards their organization. They also have a dual objective of generating metrics
for their management to show the Return on Investment (ROI) made in the SOC. Often times these
two are in conflict. Metric generation requires periodic extraction of predictable numbers from
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operations floor which is in contradiction with the creative triage that analysts like to perform.
Similar tensions are observed within operational tools that are purchased for compliance reasons
rather than being useful for analysts to perform their tasks. Chapter 6 explores the notion of
contradictions in SOCs through the lens of Activity Theory (AT) [4], first postulated in 1920s to
study human activity. The AT based analysis led to the discovery of some tensions called primary
contradictions that cannot be removed permanently. Tensions could only be mitigated and the
mitigation effort must be a continuous process. This explains why our tools had to be continuously
adapted in the SOCs to remain relevant and useful. In summary, conflict resolution on a continuous
basis in SOCs is a key requirement for innovations aimed at improving operational efficiency.
In June 2016 I got an opportunity to conduct anthropological study of another corporate
SOC. By this time I had a good understanding of the human and organizational aspects of a SOC.
I took up a job as a Senior Security Analyst performing triage of escalated incidents. Through
participant observation and reflection of day-to-day SOC activities I discovered that the SOC did
not have a solid defense against email phishing. It was initially surprising that a well studied
problem such as phishing did not have an effective solution. I worked on phishing incidents along
with the analysts to attain the native point of view of the problem. I realized that the existing
defenses failed because they did not understand some key constraints of SOC analysts. A good
amount of tacit knowledge was required to solve those phishing cases which was not captured by
any of the automation technologies in the SOC. Together with the SOC analysts and rest of the
research team, I developed a phishing detection framework called PhishNet. The tool was successful
in detecting new unknown phishing campaigns and brought down detection time from days down
to minutes proving invaluable for the SOC. Chapter 7 provides a detailed description of the tacit
knowledge capture methodology and also provides technical description of PhishNet.
I was able to achieve my intended goal of capturing tacit operational knowledge to build useful
operational tool in my final fieldwork experience. The study of burnout problem and contradictions
in SOCs kept me informed on the constraints under which PhishNet had to be developed.
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The findings from this research on SOCs can be summarized as follows:
• A SOC is a system of contradictions. Acknowledging and managing contradictions is key to
innovation.
• Failure to recognize contradictions leads to dysfunction such as burnout of security analysts.
• SOC operations are highly dynamic and hence operational tools have to be redesigned on a
continuous basis.
• Security operational knowledge is constantly generated and transformed. Successful tool
building requires periodic capture of analysts tacit knowledge.
The rest of the dissertation discusses in detail journey towards discovery of the findings.
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CHAPTER 2 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Understanding security operations requires access to operational SOCs and the cooperation
of the analysts who work in them. This access is not easy to obtain for reasons that include:
• The sensitivity of the data handled. Analysts deal with exploits that can result in loss of
valuable information, compromise the privacy of users, or physical damage to infrastructures.
A degree of paranoia seems to come with the job. With the academic research literature’s
current focus on discovery and public disclosure of vulnerabilities, researchers are seen as
untrustworthy outsiders. Gaining the subjects’ trust is a first step towards performing useful
research. Management support is necessary, but not sufficient.
• The problem of tacit knowledge. The job of a security analyst is highly complex and decisions
are made based on intuitions and hunches that are not documented [2]. In many cases,
analysts are unable to articulate what they know or describe clearly the basis for a conclusion
or action.
• The workload. SOC analysts are always confronted with more incidents than they can resolve.
Any process that requires additional efforts but does not directly help the analysts’ job is
resented.
These factors limit the utility of traditional research methods such as interviews, question-
naires, and passive observation.
Cultural anthropology is a branch of anthropology aimed at studying human beings in their
natural settings. The research method employed by cultural anthropologists is long-term participant
observation in which researchers traditionally spend a year or more within an indigenous population
as a member of the community. They take part in the day to day activities and follow the practices
of the population. This allows them to obtain an increased understanding of local practices beyond
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common assumptions about such practices. As they pull themselves deeper into local practices
they come to feel and experience the world and may eventually be able to approximate the native
point of view, in other words, understand how an insider perceives their own culture. This leads
to the researcher understanding the symbols, artifacts, and activities as they are perceived by the
members of the subject community. Without this understanding, an observer tends to process
every event performed by the subjects using the observer’s own cultural bias. Such a bias does not
lead the researcher to the true reason behind the observed activities [5]. Viewing or attempting to
view the activities from the native’s point of view is the best one could do in understanding another
culture.
The idea of attaining the native point of view resonated very well with the goal of studying
security operations because of the well defined closed culture of the SOC. The research team
sought and obtained the cooperation of the SOC management. Our team anthropologist trained
five computer science students having a computer security background in participant observation
methods which included the observation and note taking that would occur during the fieldwork
process.
Over a period of 4.5 years the students occupied positions as security analysts in five different
SOCs, two in universities and three in major corporations, a deployment that continues part of
the ongoing research effort. The student researchers have worked as level-1 & 2 analysts, incident
responders, software-developers, and forensic analysts. They have helped in training security staff
and designing security policies, becoming something like “natives” in the SOC cultures, while also
keeping detailed notes about their experiences and ongoing SOC activities.
2.1 Observation Strategy
During the fieldwork it is important to pay attention to not just what is being said, but to
what being said says. Our observation and note taking strategy is based on the S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G
model from sociolinguistics proposed by Dell Hymes [6]. Hymes proposed the model in order to
contextualize the communication that takes place at a given setting. The name of the model is an
acronym for the different factors that affect the meaning of terms spoken and received. Table 2.1
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Table 2.1: The S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G Model
Acronym Meaning
Setting and Scene Physical circumstances such as time
and place.
Participants The speaker and the audience.
Ends Purposes, goals, and outcomes.
Act sequence Form and order of the event.
Key Cues that establish the tone, man-
ner, or spirit.
Instrumentalities Forms and styles of speech.
Norms Social rules governing the event.
Genre The kind of speech act or event.
lists the meaning of the terms in the acronym. The model is also useful in analyzing our field notes
and to uncover the various conceptual factors involved.
2.2 Ethics and Participant Safety
In this research the security analysts and the managers were considered as human subjects.
The research was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)1 and analysts
completed informed consent forms that explained the research objectives and the voluntary nature
of participation. The research team addressed any concerns expressed, with a detailed description
of the nature and expected outcomes of the research. Aliases were used when referring to analysts
and their managers during discussion and data analysis to preserve their anonymity.
1See Appendix B for documentation on IRB approval.
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CHAPTER 3 : SOC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1
With an increase in cyber threats, corporations and government agencies alike are establishing
dedicated monitoring stations called security operation centers (SOCs). An organization can decide
to build its own SOC or outsource the monitoring to managed operational service providers. The
key component of any SOC, in-house or managed, is training and staffing of security analysts.
Although tools and processes improve the efficiency of operations, it is the security analysts who
make the final decision when analyzing a threat. Hence it is imperative for a SOC to spend adequate
resources in developing and maintaining an effective team of security analysts.
Myself and the research team wanted to find answer to an important question — How to
maintain a capable and enthusiastic analyst workforce? The problem bears considerable similarity
to the human capital model in economics. The Human Capital theory [8], first postulated by Adam
Smith, holds that the investment made in education and training of individuals in a society is a
resource in itself, more important than capital and natural resources. Security analysts are the
human capital of a SOC and proper investment in their continuous improvement is key for efficient
operation.
Unfortunately SOCs have been plagued by high analyst turnover due to burnout [9]. Burnout
refers to diminished interest in work and is characterized by exhaustion, cynicism and inefficacy [10].
Burnout in SOCs usually results in a high analyst turnover leading to frequent hiring and training
of new analysts. A white paper from Hewlett-Packard (HP) [3] points out that the life-time of a
security analyst is between 1-3 years. Moreover, the volatile nature also makes it hard for analysts
to know each other well, thus affecting team camaraderie, which eventually affects how the entire
team responds to security incidents. In spite of the burnout problem being well recognized, little
to nothing is known about the concrete factors that cause the burnout. If the real reasons behind
this issue are not identified, we will be only addressing the symptoms and not the actual problem.
1This chapter is based on a paper [7] published by the author in SOUPS 2015. See Appendix A for permission.
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In order to understand challenges in a SOC environment one first have to find a way to interact
with the SOC analysts. SOC analysts typically work under high stress; culturally SOCs are sensitive
about talking to outsiders – such as security researchers – about operational issues. To get visibility
into operational issues affecting the analysts, the research has to satisfy two requirements: (1) cause
minimum interruption (and only when necessary) to the analysts; (2) gain the trust of the entire
SOC so that the real reasons for burnout are explored.
With the above set of goals this work adopted an anthropological approach to study SOC
environments. Using an anthropological approach helps the researcher attain the perspective of
the analyst on exhaustion and burnout. Security analysts are typically consumed by the routines
of their job that they have no time to reflect on the social issues in the SOC. Anthropology also
allows the researcher to step in and out of the shoes of an analyst which helps in understanding
the complex interactions not attended to by the participants.
For this specific study I got trained in fieldwork methods by an anthropologist took up a job
as a security analyst for six months in a corporate SOC. The corporation is a major information
technology (IT) products and services provider headquartered in the United States. The SOC is
monitoring the enterprise’s network 24x7x365 for security threats. I went through the whole new-
analyst training process and at the end of it, he was able to do a junior analyst’s job. Through
the embedding process I earned the trust of the analysts (specific instances that led to building the
trust are discussed in further sections) and also was able to simultaneously perform the research
with minimum to no interruption to operations.
Daily observations of SOC activities were written down in a digital document for six months.
The fieldnotes were analyzed after the fieldwork using a Grounded Theory approach. The analysis
found that to mitigate analyst burnout, SOCs have to pay special attention to the interaction
of human capital with three other factors—automation, operational efficiency, and metrics. The
analysis yielded a model for human capital management in the SOC. The thesis also suggests a
number of ways to to mitigate analyst burnout and maintain healthy analyst workforce in general.
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Operations Manager Incident Management Manager
Analysts (6)L1 Analysts (18) L2 Analysts (2)
SOC Manager
Figure 3.1: Organizational Chart for the Corporate SOC
3.1 Fieldwork Setup
The fieldwork was conducted at a SOC run by and for a major IT products and services
provider headquartered in the United States. The mission of the SOC was to monitor the network
and hosts therein to identify and mitigate security threats. The network was spread all over the
world and there were about 300,000 devices online on any given day. The SOC was the only
monitoring station for cyber security for the corporate network spread across the globe.
The organizational layout of the SOC is shown in Figure 3.1. There were two different teams
within the SOC: (1) operations; (2) incident management (IM). The operations team analysts were
divided into two categories: Level 1 (L1) and Level 2 (L2). The L1 analysts work four days a week
in 10 hour shifts while the L2 analysts work 5 days a week in 8 hour shifts. L1 analysts are the first
line of defense monitoring the Security Information Event Management (SIEM) console for any
possible (attempted) security breaches. The L2 analysts play more of a managerial and mentoring
role for the L1 analysts. Their main job is to provide operational visibility for higher management
through metrics and reports. At the time of our fieldwork there were 2 L2 and 18 L1 analysts in
the operations team headed by an Operations Manager.
The IM team consisted of six analysts led by a manager. Of the six analysts two were off-site
working remotely. The IM team handles incidents that are escalated from the operations team
requiring in-depth analysis. I spent three months as an L1 analyst in the operations team and the
remaining three months as an incident responder in the IM team.
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3.2 SOC Demography
There were eighteen L1 and two L2 analysts in the operations team of the SOC. 15% (3 out
of 20) of the analysts were female and 85% (17 out of 20) were male. 35% (7 out of 20) of the
analysts had previously worked in a SOC and for 65% (13 out of 20) of them this was their first
SOC experience. Among the analysts who were new to the role of SOC analyst 46% of them (6
out of 13) had worked in a job related to IT services. Of the six analysts in the IM team, one was
female and five were male. Two worked previously as consultants performing forensic analysis and
two had been system administrators in their previous jobs.
3.3 Gaining Trust and Acceptance
Trust of L1 analysts was gained by working alongside with them on the SIEM console pro-
cessing alerts, similar to experiences of Geertz as described earlier. However, saturation occurred
only after a few weeks of visibility into the SOC operations as I was just following the procedures.
The procedures were very static and by following them I was consumed by the routines of an L1
analyst. I then started to identify high-severity threats that could have not been discovered by
following the procedures. A number of teams were engaged in solving those high-severity cases
through which I gathered the attention of senior analysts and SOC managers – I was not invisible
anymore. At this stage everyone in the SOC – junior and senior analysts including managers –
started to feel comfortable with my presence.
3.4 Data Collection
The daily observations of SOC activity were documented in a digital document. The goal was
to document every activity in the SOC without any premeditation on what to document. Often, a
theme might emerge as the observations were being logged. In those situations, focused interviews
were conducted with the analysts and managers to better understand the emerging concept. The
details of the communication were transcribed into notes as soon as possible after the conversation.
At the end of the six-month fieldwork there were 85 pages of fieldnotes stored in a word-processor
document.
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CHAPTER 4 : GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS
The goal of analyzing the fieldnotes was to uncover the different cultural aspects in an op-
erational SOC environment. Grounded Theory Method (GT) [11] is a research methodology from
the social sciences used to construct a theory from qualitative data such as interview transcripts,
images, and video of participants. The outcome of GT-based analysis of data is a model or theory
that explains the social connections represented by the data. Since we wanted to understand the
burnout problem through fieldwork data, GT seemed to be the most appropriate analysis method.
GT analysis requires one to follow the steps of open, axial, and selective coding. In the open
coding process labels are assigned to units of observed data. The researcher tries her best to assign
codes that are not descriptive but analytical capturing the intent behind the observations. During
axial coding the individual open codes are grouped into categories and sub-categories. The goal
here is to understand the inter and intra categorical relationships. Finally, in the selective coding
process the core category and the main concern of the participants is identified. There are a number
of variations of the GT methodology and this work used the one proposed by Strauss and Corbin
due to its emphasis on theory development.
4.1 Open Coding
The goal of open coding was to assign short labels to fieldwork notes. Unlike other qualitative
works where coding is performed by multiple people, the fieldnotes in this work were coded only by
the fieldworker. In anthropological research one does not share the fieldnotes with anyone else due
to privacy reasons; this is a standard practice in anthropology. Therefore, this was the rationale
behind the research team’s decision to use myself as the only coder. The list of codes as they
emerged were maintained in another document called the code book. When assigning a code to an
observation, the code book was checked first to see if any of the existing codes could be reused. If
none of them were relevant to the observation at hand, a new code was generated and the process
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continued until the entire document was coded. The fieldwork notes made over a period of six
months were 85 pages long. Below are a few examples of the codes that emerged through the open
coding process.
An IM analyst expressed frustration about his current job:
“I wanted to work in an environment where there will be continuous learning and
I have started to feel that I am not learning anything new in my current job. In fact,
I took the current job hoping to analyze malware every day and learn more in that
process. I feel that the SOC currently is not doing any real threat detection which in
turn is limiting my opportunities for learning. I have decided in my life, to spend a
significant amount of time for the improvement of my career. Now I feel bad that my
commitment is not paying off.”
The observation above was assigned the code lack of growth. This code captures the fact that
the analyst felt a lack of intellectual growth, which is a major issue in maintaining a good morale.
An L1 analyst and myself were discussing an operational scenario:
“I suggested to the analysts: why not we try to get access to the controller and
lookup the data ourselves. One of the analysts said: access to the domain controller is
too risky to be given to analysts.”
Two different codes were assigned for this observation, liability and restricted empowerment.
The SOC managers will be responsible if the analysts misuse the credentials and hence they chose
to provide only limited privileges on the domain controller. The open coding process was repeated
multiple times. Sometimes there were too many codes which made it hard to proceed and other
times the codes were not analytical enough.
4.2 Axial Coding
The goal of axial coding was to group the different codes obtained through the open coding
process into categories. The categories emerged simultaneously while going through the open
coding process. In the initial attempt of the axial coding process, where around 50 percent of the
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fieldwork notes were coded, there were around 10 categories. This initial attempt, which resulted
in 10 categories, did not convey any useful information about the culture of the SOC. I engaged
in a few brainstorming sessions with our anthropologist and the entire research team. After the
brainstorming process, the coding process was repeated on the entire fieldwork notes that resulted
in 4 categories at the end of axial coding. The most important result of the discussions was the
identification of the various causal relationships between the four categories.
The guidelines for axial coding as proposed by Strauss and Corbin [11] was followed in our
coding process. They suggest coders to look for the following relationship between the codes:
• the phenomenon under study
• the conditions related to that phenomenon (context conditions, intervening structural condi-
tions or causal conditions)
• the actions and interactional strategies directed at managing or handling the phenomenon
• the consequences of the actions/interactions related to the phenomenon
The description of codes and categories as they emerged during the early stage of axial coding
process is shown in Table 4.1. The axial coding process identified human capital, automation,
operational efficiency, and metrics as the major high-level categories.
4.3 Selective Coding
The goal of the selective coding process was to identify the core category and the main concern.
The core category emerged out to be human capital and the main concern of the participants was
the development and maintenance of human capital. In other words, the pressing issue in the SOC
was to keep the analysts motivated at work. Theoretical sampling was performed when we looked
for new data from the fieldnotes that supported the core category. The relationship framework
between categories obtained as a result of the axial coding process was altered to focus more on
the core category–the human capital. As a result of selective coding, the existence of a number of
vicious cycles connecting the core category with the rest was observed. The final outcome was a
model that explains the analyst burnout phenomenon.
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Table 4.1: Categorization of Codes at an Early Stage of Axial Coding Process
Code Meaning
Analyst Morale
Inadequate compensation (perception) Analyst perceives that she/he is not adequately com-
pensated for their efforts.
Lack of growth Analyst feels that she/he is not learning on their job.
Detailed procedures Step by step procedures are too mundane.
Imposement Analysts are given tasks to do without consultation.
Restricted empowerment Inadequate privilege or access for an analyst to do
their job.
Automation
Increased workload High event load is a good incentive for automation.
Lack of reflections No review of procedures to look for possible automa-
tion.
Liability Fear of responsibility hinders automation.
Operational Efficiency
Restricted empowerment Inadequate privilege or access for an analyst to do
their job.
Poor intelligence Incomplete information from sources outside the SOC.
Lack of cooperation Lower efficiency due to inter-operation issue between
teams.
Inadequate context Low efficiency due to contextual information sur-
rounding an alert.
Lack of clarity Incomplete understanding of operational processes
due to miscommunication.
Teams in silos Inadequate communication between teams leading to
inefficiencies.
Analyst Burnout
Superficial briefings Exhausted analysts stop providing detailed opera-
tional updates.
Cherry picking Burned out analysts pick specific events to analyze.
Metrics
Management visibility Management uses metrics as a way to gain visibility
into SOC operations.
Tools and workflow Metrics influence the workflow and tools used in the
SOC.
Perception Metrics affect the perception the management has
about the usefulness of the SOC.
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CHAPTER 5 : A MODEL FOR SOC ANALYST BURNOUT
The grounded theory based analysis of fieldwork data yielded us a model that explains the
burnout of SOC analysts. In summary, the model shows that burnout occurs due to a cyclic
interaction of Human Capital with the following three categories:
• Automation
• Operational Efficiency
• Management Metrics
The notion of Human Capital for the SOC needs to be first clarified – what it is and the
ways it is developed. I then describe the influence of the above three categories on human capital
management focusing on specific interactions that cause burnout.
5.1 Human Capital
Human capital, in the context of a SOC, refers to the knowledge, talents, skills, experience,
intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom possessed by individual analysts and the team as a
whole. Human capital can also be defined as the collective and individual intellectual stock of a
SOC. Proper development and management of the human capital is crucial for the success of SOC
operations. Mismanagement of human capital affects the morale of the analysts which in turn
reduces operational efficiency. Our model indicates that there are four factors that influence the
creation and maintenance of efficient human capital as shown in Figure 5.1.
• Skills
• Empowerment
• Creativity
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Figure 5.1: Human Capital Cycle
• Growth
Next, let us see how the interaction between these factors might either lead to an effective
team or an inefficient group of burned-out analysts.
5.1.1 Skills
Security analysts need to possess the right skills to do their job. The skill set of analysts vary
depending on a number of factors such as education and prior experience. The dynamic nature of
security threats means the analysts have to undergo periodic training. SOCs send their analysts
to paid training workshops such as those organized by SANS. The SOC also organized table top
exercises for analysts to make sure they can respond to a crisis situation. Analysts were also
encouraged to engage in peer training through presentations and hands-on exercises. For example,
an L1 analyst who was a SOC analyst before was demonstrating a threat discovery tool. The
tool took large volumes of alert information from a SIEM, summarized and provided a graphical
interface to help analysts do threat discovery. The IM team also conducted training sessions on
tools such as Volatility [12] and Cuckoo [13] for the operations analysts.
To summarize, development and continuous improvement of analysts’ skill-set is an important
aspect of human capital management. If the analysts are not adequately skilled it affects their
confidence in dealing with the security alerts. Over time the lack of confidence will manifest itself
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as frustration, especially when their job demands them to do more than their skills level permits.
SOC managers should make sure that analysts receive periodic and adequate training.
5.1.2 Empowerment
Analysts feel that they need to be adequately empowered to perform their job efficiently. An
incident observed in the IM team sheds light on the importance of empowerment:
An IM analyst expected that he be given privileged access on end user machines
so that he can perform live monitoring for malicious activity on the suspicious hosts.
The analyst was denied this access by the management. This led to frustration as the
analyst felt that he was not able to perform his tasks efficiently.
It was also observed that analysts feel empowered when they were allowed to author new
threat detection content or contribute to new tools development. Analysts feel enthusiastic when
they see the impact of their effort in one form or the other.
An L1 analyst expressed thus:
“In my previous job as a SOC analyst, access was restricted to the alert console
and what we could do was very limited. I like that in this SOC, analysts are asked to
give periodic feedback on the tools and procedures. Also, I like the fact that we are
encouraged to suggest new threat detection rules to the engineering team.”
The skill level of the analysts influences the level of empowerment the management is willing
to grant them as indicated by the causality between skills and empowerment in Figure 5.1. For
example, only skilled analysts are trusted to be careful and are provided privileged access to user
accounts. It was also observed that even if analysts are highly skilled they may not always be
empowered.
An IM analyst (highly skilled compared to L1 or L2 analysts) pointed out that his manager
was reluctant to provide privileged access to his team due to liability reasons:
“He is afraid that we, IM analysts, have accounts on social networking websites such
as LinkedIn and might fall for phishing scams. He is worried that malicious entities
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might send us targeted emails. If one of us gets compromised, privileged credentials
might be exposed and then the whole corporate network will be at risk. He does not
want to give us administrator access on user accounts for this reason.”
Empowerment plays a major role in boosting the morale of the analysts and SOC managers
have to keep in mind this important factor. Highly skilled analysts might feel handicapped in their
job when they are not adequately empowered by the management. More research is needed to
understand how to provide the right amount of empowerment to the analysts while at the same
time minimizing risk for the management.
5.1.3 Creativity
Creativity refers to the ability of analysts to handle an operational scenario that differs signif-
icantly from those they have encountered so far. The human capital model in Figure 5.1 indicates
that empowerment directly affects analysts’ creativity. If an analyst is adequately empowered, the
analyst will be more willing to deviate from the operational norms. Usually, norms are written down
procedures which severely inhibit creativity if analysts are not empowered. Lack of creativity will
lead to analysts just executing the procedures failing to react appropriately to a novel operational
scenario.
Another observation highlights the impact of “lack of creativity” on operations:
“An analyst encountered an operational scenario where he had to email a member of
a business unit to validate an alert but was very hesitant to proceed. After waiting for
a while he contacted a senior analyst and asked him for advice on how to proceed. The
junior analyst specifically said that he does not know how to proceed as this scenario
was not covered by any of the procedures.”
On the other hand, members of the IM team were more creative than L1 analysts. We
observed that IM analysts were constantly trying to learn new technologies and this behavior was
encouraged by their manager. The IM analysts were empowered as they were more skilled than
the L1 analysts in the SOC. Thus one can see the causal influence between skills, empowerment,
and creativity.
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It also observed that the lack of variation in the operational tasks lead to lower creativity
levels. The daily alerts received by the SOC are very much alike, which means an analyst has to
take the same response steps for each of the received alerts. To summarize, creative development
is an important aspect of human capital management. Empowerment plays an important role in
ensuring creativity. The SOC management also must make sure that they find ways to engage their
analysts in creative activities when the operational tasks get repetitive.
5.1.4 Growth
Growth in the context of the SOC refers to increase in the intellectual capacity of the ana-
lysts. Learning on-the-job is one of the dominant ways through which an analyst achieves growth.
An analyst, by handling different types of security incidents, learns new skills and improves her
knowledge on security analysis. This learning improves her morale as it gives a sense of purpose and
accomplishment. As it can be observed in Figure 5.1, growth is directly influenced by creativity.
Mundane daily activities will lead to lower creativity development. Lower creativity means the
analyst will use the same set of skills everyday in the job which in turn inhibits intellectual growth.
Growth also occurs through learning from role models – an analyst learns from a more experienced
one.
It was observed that highly empowered analysts sometimes were not satisfied with their
growth because of lack of creativity in their job. During a conversation with an IM analyst, who
had relatively higher empowerment than an L1 or L2 operational analyst, the analyst expressed his
concerns over stagnation of growth:
“I took this job as an IM analyst because I was excited about analyzing a variety
of malware everyday but I am not able do it as the SOC is not doing real security
monitoring. I also do not have anybody on the team to look up to and learn from.
Everyone is less skilled than myself and that means I have to teach them all the time.
I love teaching new skills to other analysts but it affects me when I cannot learn from
anybody else.”
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Figure 5.2: Human Capital Vicious Cycle
Another possibility through which growth occurs is through career progression.
An L1 analyst in the SOC was planning to quit his job to pursue an analyst role at
another SOC presumably requiring more skills. The managers realized this and offered
him a job in the IM team team within the SOC. He accepted the job deciding to stay
which was beneficial for the SOC management as they were able to retain an experienced
analyst.
If an analyst has outgrown her current role – which may be because they stayed considerably
long in the job and reached a saturation point in their learning process – then the manager can
reassign her to another position that is more challenging. This will ensure that the learning process
never stops ensuring growth and good morale. Unfortunately, this is not a solution that will work
all the time since there are only a few positions available at any given time to reassign analysts.
Growth, through any of the suggested means, enhances the skill-set of the analysts.
5.1.5 Burnout Trajectory and Avoidance
As long as a positive causality among the factors – skills, empowerment, creativity, and growth
– exists, the morale of the analysts will remain high. Burnout occurs when a SOC gets stuck in a
vicious cycle connecting those factors. For instance, the SOC management hires entry level (not
highly skilled) analysts due to budget constraints. These analysts will not be empowered enough
as the managers do not trust the abilities of their analysts. This lower empowerment will lead to
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lower creativity, which will in turn lead to lower growth and skills. Since the skill level of analysts
remains the same (very low) this will again lead to low empowerment, creativity, and growth. If
this continues eventually the analysts will be burned out as they will start to feel that they are
not accomplishing anything in their job–in other words, there is no growth, and the repetitiveness
of the job exhausts the analysts. The vicious cycle is illustrated in Figure 5.2. This is a vicious
cycle because the management wants their analysts’ skill set to progressively get better through
on-the-job experience, but the negative causality among the four factors deteriorates the human
capital of the SOC.
Although the analysts are less skilled, the management can take some risk and empower
the analysts–perhaps gradually. After a few positive cycles in the human capital management
cycle (Figure 5.1) the analysts will gain more skills. The SOC managers will now trust the skilled
analysts and empower them with privileges. This will in turn encourage creativity and growth–
turning the cycle into a virtuous one. It is possible that even after the cycle is taken in a positive
direction the job of an analyst can become too repetitive. One way to deal with the repetitiveness
is by providing new opportunities for analysts to stay creative. If the management finds that the
analyst has completely outgrown her position, efforts should be taken to find a more challenging
role for the person, ensuring positive growth. The bottom line is that to avoid analyst burnout
SOC management must be careful not to get caught in the vicious cycle of human capital and be
watchful for any signs leading to such trajectory.
5.2 Automation
Automation in a SOC refers to software tools that aid analysts’ job and improve operational
efficiency. Automation includes complex software such as Security Information Event Management
(SIEM) to simple scripts written in Python or Ruby. Software tools are extremely efficient in
performing repetitive tasks. Repetitiveness leads to lower creativity as we noted in the discussion
on human capital. By automating repetitive tasks, skilled human analyst will have more freedom
to engage in more sophisticated investigations.
During the fieldwork it was discovered that effective automation takes place only if a process
called reflection takes place within and among the analysts as shown in Figure 5.3. Reflection
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Figure 5.3: Automation
in a SOC is usually done by periodically reviewing the procedures with the goal of identifying
operational bottlenecks that can benefit from automation.
Here is an example of reflection leading to automation from our fieldwork:
Every time an end-user device is identified to be infected with certain classes of
malware, the standard remediation measure in the SOC was to ask the user to reimage
their device with a clean operating system (OS) image. The instructions were written
down in an email template and the only data that varied from one user to another was
the username and hostname of the device. Other than that, it was the same email
and there were hundreds of such emails sent everyday manually. One day an L2 analyst
realized that this process is cumbersome and wrote down a script that will automatically
fetch the username, hostname, and email address of the infected device/user to send a
mass mail.
Automation through reflection can only occur if the analysts are empowered and incentivized
to do so. In the example mentioned above the analyst automated the repetitive process due to his
own personal interest outside his working hours. He said that the management did not want him
to consider automation at the same priority level as report generation.
Reflections are beneficial and practically easier if started earlier. An analyst pointed out the
difficulty arising from delaying this process based on his experience:
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“At one point we had procedures written down for everything and analysts were
starting to feel like robots performing the same tasks everyday. We did not have any
reviews to refine the processes as at one point nobody was even documenting them
properly.”
To automate complex tasks the analysts have to work with software developers—another form
of empowerment. By reflecting on the operational procedures the analysts provide requirements
for tools to the developers. The developers develop the tool based on the requirements from the
analysts through multiple development iterations. This is called the analyst-developer tool co-
creation approach.
The tool co-creation approach actually works as I engaged in a co-creation tool development
process with analysts at the SOC. The research team of the company developed an algorithm
to identify malware from DNS request and response traffic. An initial prototype of the tool was
developed by the researchers through collaboration with software developers. The prototype was
then deployed in the SOC and I was asked to provide feedback on the usability and effectiveness
of the tool. Other analysts and I observed a number of mismatches between the functionality of
the tool and the workflow of the SOC. There were weekly meetings during when actual workflow
requirements of the SOC were conveyed to the researchers. A new version of the tool would then
be deployed with the feature requests implemented. Eventually the tool turned out to be very
useful for the analysts in their investigations. This process continued even after our fieldwork as
the workflow of a SOC is very dynamic. This experience showed that a better way to design tools
for SOCs could be to engage the analysts and developers in a co-creation process.
It appears that automation serves two main purposes in enriching the human capital. First
of all, analysts can engage in interesting and challenging investigation tasks if the repetitive tasks
are automated. It was also observed that the co-creation process, which results in automation,
provides a platform for the analysts to express their creativity. SOC managers must pay attention
to this important effect that automation has on human capital to mitigate burnout.
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5.3 Operational Efficiency
An efficient SOC will be able to leverage all its resources to detect and respond to threats in
a timely manner. Since analysts make all the final decisions during operations, human capital has
a direct influence on operational efficiency. We also observed that this relationship is bidirectional
in that an efficient SOC positively influences the human capital. We see this two way relationship
in Figure 5.4.
The direct causality from human capital to operational efficiency indicates the obvious fact
that the highly skilled and creative analysts make operations efficient. Human capital also affects
efficiency in operations through automation via reflections. The resulting automation accelerates
operations—especially in case of highly repetitive tasks. Here is an example for operational ef-
ficiency through automation from our fieldwork. An L1 analyst mentioned the following about
creating incident tickets:
“Case creation takes too much time. Filling in a ticket to locate hosts is the most
demanding task. The fields are not fillable as you have to select the entry. There is a
script written by an L2 analyst to automate this task. I need to give it a try.”
On the other hand, the benefits resulting from operational efficiency in turn create a positive
influence on the analysts. Most of the efficiency is achieved through automation by reflections.
Reflections provide an opportunity for the analysts to exercise their creativity. This in turn helps
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in the growth of human capital. An inefficient SOC means reduced automation leading to analysts
performing the repetitive tasks manually. This will lead to exhaustion and burnout of analysts
eventually. In a vicious cycle, the SOC management could be spending resources on hiring highly
skilled analysts who if not empowered to engage in reflections, will lead reduced automation. Op-
erational efficiency suffers due to reduced automation. The inefficiency wears out the analysts as
they have to manually perform tasks that could be effectively performed by software. The vicious
cycle could be converted to a virtuous one by empowering analysts to facilitate automation through
reflections.
5.4 Metrics
A SOC has to periodically measure its efficiency for a number of reasons:
• Measure employee efficiency for bonus considerations
• Measure and tune intrusion detection sensors
• Identify bottlenecks in operational procedures
• Most importantly, provide visibility into the SOC for the upper management
During the fieldwork we tried to understand the influence of metrics on the human capital.
We observed that it is very challenging to come to light with good metrics for security operations.
It is challenging because either the metrics are too technical making it hard for the management to
measure their return-on-investment, or they are too managerial thereby failing to convey exactly
the operational activities in the SOC. Some of the metrics that were automatically generated from
the SIEM solution are shown in Table 5.1.
A SOC is an investment from a management perspective and SOC managers have to fre-
quently communicate the benefit the company gets from such an investment. This is vital for the
continued support from the upper management as one of the managers mentioned:
“Corporations are very eager to start an operations center in-house and they fund
SOC builders to establish one. After a while they stop seeing value in the SOC, shut it
down and move it to managed services. A few years later they realize an in-house SOC
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Table 5.1: SOC Operations Metrics
Metric Measured Quantity Purpose
Event volume graph Number of events re-
ceived per day
Used to anticipate how many analysts
will be need to analyze new event
sources.
Bulk processed count Number of events that
were bulk processed
Used to identify either improper analy-
sis, or problem with a sensor generating
too many events.
Duplicate comments graph Number of events that
were bulk processed
Used to identify either improper analy-
sis, or problem with a sensor generating
too many events.
Missed events Number of events left
unprocessed per day
Identify events falling through the
cracks, taking more than a day to ana-
lyze, and if procedures are not followed.
Average processing time Average time taken to
analyze an event
Estimate how much time it takes for
analysts to investigate an event.
is better for them and they redo the process all over. This is hard for guys like me as
we spend more than a year establishing the SOC infrastructure and training analysts.
A lot of effort goes into it. As SOC managers we need to keep communicating to the
management how their investment in the SOC is justified.”
Devising appropriate metrics is complicated by the fact that even the higher managers are
not sure what shall be the right metrics. A senior manager once responded to an L1 analyst’s
question on what the higher management perceived as good metrics for SOC operations as thus:
“I am not sure what the right metrics are and that is something I am working on.
But I have some idea on what would be a good metric. If you tell me you processed
some thousands of events over a month that does not tell anything interesting to me.
But if you tell me a case where you engaged multiple teams–vulnerability management,
red team, etc.–and how that resulted in the creation of new detection points–e.g. a new
AV signature–or how it helped in creating new analytics that will be a good indication
of what value I am getting from the SOC. Again, I do not know how you guys can give
me the metrics but you have all the data and it is your job to come up with a good way
to communicate your success stories.”
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The pressure for good metrics is relayed down to the SOC managers who in turn hand it
down to the analysts. On one occasion, a SOC manager expressed frustration about the lack of
good metrics for him to talk to his managers:
“I need stories to talk to my managers. You analysts are like snipers making a
number of hits but I am not getting enough stories to tell my managers. You guys need
to generate useful reports so that I can convey the usefulness of the SOC.”
Figure 5.5 also shows that there is a direct causality between metrics and human capital.
In the worst case, the metrics will decide the tasks an analyst can perform in the SOC–a form of
restricted empowerment. An L1 analyst expressed frustration that supports our claim:
“We feel that we are not doing security monitoring in the SOC. I think we are just
working to generate numbers for higher management. We have raised some ethical
concerns with the management regarding this.”
The figure also shows the interlink between metrics and the rest of the categories. The dotted
line between operational efficiency and metrics is to indicate the fact that metrics act as a com-
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municating channel between SOC operations and the management. There is a possibility for the
formation of a vicious cycle even in this context. The demand for metrics from the management
might negatively affect the morale of the analysts, that in turn negatively affects operational effi-
ciency. The management’s perception of the usefulness of the SOC is driven by the metrics and the
lack of good metrics communicating the value of the SOC will lead to reduced funds allocated for
the SOC. A reduced budget is usually translated into less training opportunities which will drive
the vicious cycle of human capital. More research has to be done on defining meaningful metrics
to measure SOC efficiency benefiting the analysts and the management. The analysts benefit from
good metrics as promotions and other perks are decided by the numbers conveyed by the metrics.
The management, on the other hand, will be able to measure better their return on investment on
the SOC.
5.5 Burnout Model Validation
The fieldwork notes that resulted from anthropological study of a higher education University
was used for validation of the burnout model. The research team conducted fieldwork at this SOC
for two years. The SOC is relatively smaller compared with the corporate SOC. There are 4 analysts
headed by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The SOC is the only security monitoring
center for the three campuses of the University. There were 55,000 devices connecting to the network
during business hours at the time of our study. The analysts performed operational tasks such as
incident management, firewall management, and payment card industry (PCI) compliance as shown
in Figure 5.6. The analysts in this SOC have diverse responsibilities compared to the corporate
SOC. This is due to the smaller team size which also means analysts often have to multitask.
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5.6 Fieldwork Setup
Five students in Computer Science, graduate and undergraduate, have worked as security
analysts over a period of 2 years in the University SOC. They were trained by our anthropologist
in participant observation methods and in note taking during fieldwork. The students were em-
bedded as analysts and performed various tasks in the SOC such as incident handling, anti-virus
management, host-based anti-virus maintenance, and firewall management. In addition to the op-
erational tasks they also built useful tools to increase operational efficiency. As in the corporate
SOC, observations were recorded in a digital document.
5.7 Burnout Symptoms
The research team did observe signs of analysts burnout, but in the University SOC they
exhibited different symptoms. The burnout manifested itself mostly in the form of frustration.
However, there was not high analyst turnover contrary to the previous SOC. We postulate that
this was due to the location of the University. The University is located in a small town and the
analysts do not have too many options when switching jobs as was the case in the corporate SOC.
Following sections present the results of validating the human capital model for analyst burnout
on fieldnotes from the University SOC. Some of the factors actually helped improve the morale of
the analysts, thus enriching the human capital. The validation process found examples for factors
that enabled and also helped mitigate burnout.
5.8 Automation
Analysts of this SOC were stuck performing the repetitive tasks everyday. One analyst
expressed his frustration:
“I want to do some interesting analysis on the data we are collecting but I am stuck
with processing the same tickets everyday.”
Fortunately, the analysts in this SOC were empowered to engage in periodic reflection of
operational procedures. The fieldworkers engaged in periodic reflections with the analyst as part of
31
the co-creation process. The result was a tool that automated most of the ticket generation process
enabling the analyst to focus on interesting investigations.
In another instance, the fieldworkers developed a tool that automated malware analysis. The
University’s email provider placed certain restrictions on the type of files that can be attached
in an email. This was done to prevent the spread of malware through email. Any message that
contained one of those restricted attachment types were forwarded to a special inbox monitored by
the SOC. One of the analysts used to manually download the files in the inbox, conduct analysis to
eliminate duplicates and false positives, and submit the list of unique file hashes to the anti-virus
(AV) vendor. The AV vendor would then determine based on the submitted hashes if there were
any new malware unknown to them. Signatures to detect new malware, if any, would then be
pushed out to the University’s AV subscribers.
All the steps in the above process were performed manually by one analyst. One day the
analyst called one of the fieldworkers and asked for help in automating this process. He wrote
down the steps he was undertaking in an email after a day of reflection. A tool was then written
to automate most of the steps in the process. Later on, the tool was handed over to another team
outside the SOC, presumably less skilled than the SOC analysts. The analyst was very happy
that the task got oﬄoaded to the other team as he now was able to focus on other sophisticated
operational tasks.
Many such mundane operational tasks got automated this way, enabling the them to work
on more creative tasks. These observations from our fieldnotes validated the causality between
operational efficiency and human capital in Figure 5.5. Here we see a positive cycle between
empowerment, automation, and operational efficiency leading to good morale of the analysts as
suggested by our model.
5.9 Empowerment
The major factor that was affecting the human capital in this SOC was the cooperation issue
with other information technology (IT) departments within the University. Often times the SOC
has to work with other IT teams such as networking or server management to resolve a security
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incident. Since security might not be a high priority for other teams the remediation process gets
delayed.
This often causes frustration for SOC analysts. For example, one analyst expressed dissatis-
faction in ticket management process by stating this:
“I cannot close my old tickets as we are waiting on these other departments.”
In another instance, the university network was experiencing an unusual amount of traffic
that was severely slowing down or disrupting vital services. Moreover, an uncommon behavior and
load was noticed on several important networking devices. In order to troubleshoot the problem,
the analysts needed to interact with the teams that manage the services and also the network
equipment vendors. General reactions from the other entities:
“Don’t take my VLAN down. The problem is not here.”
It was very challenging for the analysts to identify the source of the problem without tem-
porarily disabling any services. Eventually, one of the analysts was able to pinpoint the misbehaving
device. All these events happened during regular business hours and while the higher management
was insisting on solving the problem as soon as possible.
During another instance an analyst had to wait on the department that managed servers for
resources to deploy the developed tools. There were numerous issues with the server management
department such as not enough staff and inadequate hardware resources that delayed the tool
deployment.
On another occasion, one of the analysts came up with a creative way to distribute logs
across machines to improve efficiency of log collection. Unfortunately, they were kept waiting for
11 months by the server management department. In this case the lack of inter-departmental
support (cooperation) affected the use of the analyst’s creativity.
In a nutshell, one can classify facilitating support of other departments as a form of empower-
ment called cooperation. The SOC management is in the most capable position to facilitate this. In
the examples cited above the analysts required support from other departments in order to perform
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their jobs effectively. The analysts got frustrated due to the lack of support from other departments.
This frustration has often led to analysts losing their temper, thus one can see that the causality
between empowerment and creativity indicated by the model in Figure 5.1 is validated.
5.10 Metrics
Similar to the corporate SOC there were metrics in use to measure analysts performance and
the usefulness of various tools used in the SOC. It was observed that metrics influenced the analysts’
view on the perception of their performance. In other words, the more reflective the metrics of the
analysts’ achievements were, the more confident they were in the management’s evaluation.
Defining good operational metrics was again a challenging task for the management, similar
to the corporate SOC. For example, the SOC manager wanted the analysts to spend a fixed amount
of time on operational tasks and the rest on projects—tasks that lead to improvement of the SOC
infrastructure. The manager also asked each of the analysts to enter the time they spend on each
of the two tasks every week. The senior management wanted to know the amount of time the SOC
analysts were spending on operations, hence the CISO devised this metric. The rationale behind
this, from the management’s perspective, was that the purpose of the SOC was to provide services
to the users of the University’s network. The management wanted the analysts to spend more time
on operations for that reason.
The problem though was that there was a difference of opinion between the management and
analysts on what constituted an operational task. Analysts were concerned that the metric did not
account for the time spent on meetings and other tasks that were neither operational nor project
work. The view among the analysts was that one cannot bin the tasks performed by analysts into
discrete categories.
There were also attempts to measure the time each analyst spent on creating tickets. This
feature was implemented in the ticketing system to track the time taken by an analyst to resolve
an incident. The SOC management wanted to use this feature as a way to measure their return
on investment on the analysts. The analysts raised concerns that this may not be reflective of the
actual effort spent in resolving incidents:
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“I sometimes spend a few good hours on an alert and find out that it is a false
positive. Does that mean I am not productive? It is just the way incident handling
works and this metric does not capture that.”
These observations validate the direct causality between metrics and human capital in Fig-
ure 5.5. The metrics did not reflect the effort of the analysts which in turn led to dissatisfaction,
driving down their morale.
Another observation indicated the effect of metrics on human capital through management
perception. As described earlier this SOC has only 4 analysts but often have too many operational
tasks to handle. The CISO mentioned a while ago, a few good times, about hiring a new analyst but
that never happened. Meanwhile, it was also observed that the analysts were not content with the
financial compensation they were receiving. The perception was that they were given more tasks
with no perceived increase in their compensation. The continued existence of this concern among
the analysts highlighted the fact that the metrics were not reflective of the operational situation.
Right metrics could have indicated to the management that the SOC was understaffed and could
benefit from recruitment of another analyst. Thus one could see a validation for the causality
between the metrics affecting the morale of the human capital via the management perception and
budgeting.
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CHAPTER 6 : SOC AS A SYSTEM OF CONTRADICTIONS1
The motivation for any anthropological study is to obtain insights into various activities
humans perform within their cultural context. Each SOC has a culture of its own and it is within
that culture that the meaning of tools and processes have to be interpreted. Activity Theory
(AT) as proposed by Leont’ev [4] and further refined by Engestro¨m [15] is used to facilitate our
understanding. At the core of AT based modeling is the notion that humans are collective beings
and their activities are goal- or objective-directed. Without an objective there is no meaning to
any deliberate human activity. AT also models how we use tools to achieve an objective while
emphasizing the distributed nature of accomplishment. Thus, the framework proposed by AT is
well suited for analyzing work in operational environments.
An interesting discovery was the existence of tensions and contradictions within the SOC
environments. In the SOC context, the research team found tensions between the analysts and
the tools they used as well as conflicts between analysts and various operating rules. I first model
SOC operations as an activity (in AT sense) and then list the multiple levels of contradictions that
existed in the SOCs we studied. To the best of our knowledge this thesis is the first to systematically
identify and study conflicts within SOCs.
Based on the research team’s understanding of the systemic tensions in SOCs, this research
reveals that the action-operation dynamics from AT indicate a way to resolve certain tensions,
e.g., building tools that automate analysts tasks that have become “operations,” i.e., repetitive
and boring. This frees analysts to perform more creative analytical actions while also generating
new tensions and contradictions in the organization and workflow. This process is on-going and
tools need to be constantly adapted in a SOC environment as threats change and events evolve.
Analysts move constantly between the acting and operating stages. This is the reason why “static”
or inflexible tools fail in SOCs. Our success stories occur when the tools we co-create with analysts
1This chapter is based on a paper [14] published by the author in SOUPS 2016. See Appendix A for permission.
36
keep evolving to resolve new conflicts. It will become clear in the later sections of this thesis that
the tensions do not always revolve around operational tools. A tool is one component of a set of
forces that interact together creating friction due to certain inherent contradictions.
This thesis proposes a novel “Pentagon Model,” an extension of the hierarchical structure
of human activity originally proposed in Activity Theory, to capture the knowledge generation
and transformation in SOCs and the proper roles of tools in SOC operations. It provides a novel
framework within which developers for SOCs can elicit requirements for their tools. It was found
that identifying and resolving contradictions is a prerequisite not just to building a useful tool but
to implementing any novel idea in a SOC. A tool is part of the larger context of SOC workflow and
becomes involved in complex interactions that impact multiple dimensions and domains within the
SOC. In this way, a tool is not “just a tool” and must be understood within this broader context.
A 3.5 year journey and a substantial amount of data analysis was required to reach these
conclusions. In the subsequent sections of the thesis, one story about building an incident response
portal for a SOC is used to illustrate this journey, and explain rationales behind any methods we
used in the research and models/results formulated from the analysis.
6.1 The Need for an Incident Response Tool
Early on in this research it was observed that the bulk of the analysts’ time is spent responding
to security incidents reported by external third party entities. The most common of those incidents
is malware trying to connect to its command and control (C&C) server. The third party provides the
university with information containing the type of malware, the IP address on which the malware
activity was observed, usually that of the external interface of the NAT firewall, and the time at
which the activity was detected. All this information is sent as an alert via email messages. The
responding analyst has to follow the following steps in sequence.
1. Identify the internal IP of the infected client from the firewall NAT logs.
2. Use the internal IP to identify the MAC address of the infected host from DHCP and/or
ARP logs.
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3. Look up the identity of the user of the infected device using the MAC address from the
authentication logs.
4. Determine the point of contact (POC) for the incident based on the location of the user (e.g.,
a department).
Once the analyst obtains all or most of the information, he recommends a potential remedi-
ation measure (e.g., format the host disk and re-install the OS), and then puts all the information
into a ticket and sends it to the POC. The owner of the infected device also gets a notification
about the infection and the recommended remediation steps.
This seemingly simple task is laborious and time consuming. No single tool available at the
SOC can provide the direct answer to the question “who is the owner of the infected device,”
even though the correlations from the multiple logs are straightforward. The deployed security
information and event management (SIEM) solution was very slow even for searches on a single
week’s data. Discovering correlations in the data within the SIEM was almost impossible due to
its unacceptably slow performance. The analyst had to manually inspect multiple logs for each of
the alerts and it took 10 minutes (on average) to correlate the logs and file a single ticket. The
SOC received approximately 15 such alerts per day. It was obvious to our student researchers
that the analyst got burned out by this repetitive task as did the student researcher tasked to
do the same job. He felt that his time was spent on meaningless activity and that he was doing
nothing interesting. Further aggravating the situation was the manager’s insistence on detailed
documentation of the manual method (by the student) so that anyone could perform it.
6.1.1 Reflection on the Process
At this point I became frustrated by the repetitiveness of his SOC job. This is the moment at
which he started to gain the native point of view as an analyst. Just as our student researcher was
feeling that he had lost the direction of his research, he and the whole research team engaged in a
reflection process, where the field worker discussed his problems with the rest of the research team.
Through this process, it was realized that these specific problems can be addressed by building a
custom tool for responding to this type of incident. It was clear that this insight arose because I
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had reached an essential native point of view unattainable through other means such as interviews.
At the same time, it was clear that I brought uncommon skills, i.e., tool building, to the analyst
position.
6.2 How the Tool Worked
The reflection process identified steps in this repetitive process that could be automated.
For the malware incident described above the task of a security analyst could be decomposed to
answering the following set of questions.
1. What - Type of threat reported.
2. Who - Users, IP address, security personnel, etc.
3. When - Time the threat was reported and other temporal information.
4. Where - Location of the infected device in the network/organization.
5. How and Why - Context that could have raised the alert, perhaps the most important and
interesting.
The analyst was stuck in this process because he was spending more time gathering the
basic information such as who and where rather than on establishing the context – how and why.
The research team realized that tools must gather and deduce information along the four basic
dimensions of information (what, who, when and where) so that the analysts could spend their
cognitive effort along the analytical dimensions (how and why). This insight helped me to build
the incident response tool.
6.2.1 Automated Incident Response
Together with the analysts I built an incident response portal based on this insight. A
database was used to store log information and collected and parsed logs using periodically executed
scripts, making the process more efficient. The database also contained a relationship between net
blocks and the POC that allowed the notification of the responsible incident response personnel.
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Figure 6.1: The Incident Response Portal
The tool has a web interface through which the analyst enters: (1) the external facing IP
address and port number where malicious activities were reported; (2) the remote IP address and
port number involved in the activities; (3) the timestamp and time zone when the activities were
observed. The tool correlates this information and presents the analyst with a filled-in incident
ticket with all the required information such as the user of the infected device and the POC. The
analyst then performs the analytical steps answering how and why the incident might have occurred
in the first place. He then suggests possible remediation measures and submits them to the ticketing
system. Thanks to the new tool the whole incident response process was reduced from 10 minutes
to 10 seconds. The time saving is due to the automation of the old tasks of manually searching the
various logs to establish the who and where aspects of the incident, now done through automated
database queries using the information entered into the web interface. Figure 6.1 shows the basic
workflow of the tool. This appears similar to a SIEM workflow yet none of the SIEM products that
we found in the SOCs provides the automation provided in the incident response portal.
This shows a major problem in the design methods used for security products. Without
understanding the workflow of a SOC and where the friction points are, a tool is useless. My tool
was quickly adopted by the SOC analysts. It not only resolved a major bottleneck in the SOC’s
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workflow, but also broke a major trust barrier for our student fieldworkers. After this tool was
successfully built and used by the SOC analysts, the analysts immediately became more open to
discussing other challenges in their work to our fieldworkers, and sought our help in building other
tools that ease their job. This tool co-creation process was the first major finding in 3.5 years’ this
anthropological study [2].
6.3 What Happened Afterwards
After this initial success a number of other problems in the SOC that can benefit from
automation were identified. The research team developed a number of tools to automate those
recurring analyses. The tools were well received and the SOC process was more efficient than
before.
The research went on and we conducted fieldwork at three additional SOCs – another univer-
sity SOC and two corporate SOCs. Unlike the university SOCs, the corporate SOCs were highly
hierarchical. Analysts in one corporate SOC are classified as level-1 (L1, lowest level), level-2 (L2),
and incident response (IR, highest level). In this SOC, one of the students worked as L1 and IR
analyst while at the same time developing some forensic analysis tools. The other corporate SOC
outsourced its L1 tasks to a third party and our student fieldworker took the role of L2 analyst.
The corporate SOCs had more analysts (around 22 L1s, 2 L2s, and 5 IRs in one SOC) compared to
the university SOCs. Analysts in the corporate SOCs had well-defined roles while in the university
SOCs they always had to engage in cross-training and wear multiple hats due to small team sizes.
When the student researchers returned to the first university SOC after a few months, they
found that the incident response portal had been rarely used in their absence. The research team
realized that lack of support for the tool was the cause for concerns. New requirements kept
emerging and the analysts in the SOC analysts had neither time nor the skills required to customize
the tools as the requirements evolved. It dawn on the research team, that there was more to the
success or failure of the tools beyond their technical features.
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6.4 Further Analysis of the Field Work Data
The experience with the incident response portal encouraged the research team to return to
the field notes and dig deeper to further understand the role of tool building in SOCs and whether
there is a guiding principle that could allow us to replicate the success achieved in terms of building
successful tools to help SOC operations. After six months of analysis, I discovered that an adapted
version of a well known model called Activity Theory can form the cornerstone of this guiding
principle.
6.4.1 Activity Theory
The origin of Activity Theory (AT) is found in the works of the Russian psychologists
Leont’ev [4] and Vygotsky [16] during the 1970s and 1980s. AT has a proven record of helping
researchers comprehend various challenges in work environments. For example, it has been used to
study the use of technology in educational environments, to understand the changes brought on by
introducing new technology (laptops) into teaching practices [17], and to study the differences be-
tween the teachers’ beliefs and actual practice when a new tool is introduced in learning [18, 19, 20].
Researchers used AT to understand the effect of new tools on learners, especially their resistance to
newly introduced technology for learning, and on highlighting how old habits impede the adoption
of new tools [21].
The AT model in Figure 6.2 is adapted from Engestro¨m [15]. Elements of the original model
are shown in parentheses and in red font. Un-parenthesized elements result from our application
of the model to SOC operations. Engestro¨m defines an activity system as object oriented, collec-
tive, and culturally mediated human activity [22]. The fundamental idea of AT is that humans
perform tasks to achieve an objective. Without that objective the task has no meaning. The
inner downward-pointing triangle symbolizes the interactions of individuals and the collective in
achieving an objective. Each edge in the downward triangle represents the relationship between the
three nodes [15]: (a) an individual does certain tasks to achieve an objective, (b) an individual is
part of a social structure represented by the community node, and (c) the community of which the
individual is a part of acts together to achieve an objective. Furthermore, the three relationships
are mediated by three different aspects – instrument, rules and division of labor, forming the en-
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Figure 6.2: Activity Theory Model of Security Operations
compassing upward-pointing triangle. In trying to accomplish their objective humans use certain
tools or in AT terms instrument. The tools can be physical, such as a hammer when breaking
rocks, or symbolic such as language for communication. AT further states that human beings do
not act in isolation but within a community. There are certain rules that govern interactions among
the members of the community. In order to achieve their objective, people take up different roles
(division of labor) based on their expertise.
According to AT, tool mediation – design, use, and preservation of physical and symbolic
instruments – is seen as a major distinguishing factor between human and animal activities [15, 23].
The two triangles in the AT model Figure 6.2 together represent three different types of mediated
interactions [23]: (a) subject-object interaction is mediated by Instrument, (b) interaction of subject
with their community is governed by Rules, and (c) a community achieves their objective by taking
up specific roles corresponding to Division of Labor. The three different mediations arise due to
social, cultural, and cognitive aspects of human life.
A SOC can be modeled as an activity system where the subjects are the analysts and their
objective is to monitor/mitigate threats and provide situational awareness. To achieve this objective
they use tools such as SIEM, home-brewed software and scripts, and their knowledge in computer
security. The community they interact with includes other analysts, management, and end users.
The traditional rules governing the communication between analysts and other stakeholders are
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the so-called standard operating procedures (SOP). SOPs recommend course of action for every
incident type guiding the analyst in drafting a communication and mitigation plan in response to a
security incident. Analysts also assume roles on the operations floor, e.g., level-1 (junior) analyst,
level-2 (journeyman) analyst, incident responder, forensic analyst, etc.Under this interpretation, it
is easy to see that a SOC work environment fits nicely within the AT framework.
AT has been successful in understanding distributed human activity ranging from primeval
hunting to modern day work environments. So it is natural that SOC operations can be successfully
captured by the AT model. AT also sheds light on the use of tools by humans in achieving their
goals in collaborative activities. Since one of our goals were to obtain insights on the role of tools
in SOC operations, it further convinced the research team to use AT to drive further analysis.
6.5 Analysis Methods and the First Result
Throughout the 3.5 years of fieldwork spanning 4 SOCs there were many recurring patterns
and similarities in their problems. Due to the large amount of field note data, a systematic approach
is needed to ensure the objectivity and comprehensiveness of the analysis.
This specific analysis of field note data is both inductive and deductive. It is inductive in
the sense that we look for patterns in data without any preconceived hypothesis. As theories are
formulated to explain the patterns found in one part of the data, those theories are also tested on
other parts of data. In this sense the analysis is also deductive. To facilitate this type of analysis,
a qualitative data analysis technique called template analysis is leveraged.
6.5.1 Template Analysis of Data
Template analysis is a qualitative data analysis technique developed by Nigel King [24]. It is
useful when the researcher has a partial understanding of the concepts to be identified in the data.
This technique starts with an a priori set of codes or themes that the researcher is interested in
and the codes evolve as the analysis is performed. The technique is flexible in that the researcher
starts with some preconceived concepts but can also identify and add new concepts as they are
discovered. Below are the steps in the template analysis process.
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1. Define a priori themes: A set of themes are developed based on the concepts the researcher
is interested in identifying in the data.
2. Transcribe and familiarize: The researcher reads through the field notes and familiarizes
herself with the data she is going to analyze.
3. Initial coding: Parts of the field notes that are relevant to the research questions are identified.
Then the a priori codes are attached to those parts of the data wherever they are applicable.
When a section of fieldnote data matches the research question but no existing code could be
applied, a new code is devised or an existing one is broadened to cover it.
4. Produce initial template: Once a subset of the data is coded a set of themes is generated.
These form the initial template. The template might have a hierarchy of codes within each
of the themes.
5. Develop the template: The initial template is applied to the entire data set repeatedly. Mod-
ifications to the template are performed whenever a text does not fit into the template. This
iterative process refines the code set and a final template is produced.
6. Interpretation: At this point, the researcher has coded the entire data using the developed
template and writes up her findings based on the final template.
7. Quality checks and reflexivity: The researcher periodically consults with an expert team that
includes fellow researchers on the project to ensure quality of the analysis she performs. The
coding researcher must also perform frequent reflections to make sure her own personal beliefs
and biases do not affect the interpretation of the collected data.
A study by Frambach et al.exploring the effect of globalization on medical education provided
the inspiration for combining AT with template analysis [25]. Following this work, I began by
looking for the basic elements of the AT model in the fieldwork data and found that the model
provided substantial explanatory power for understanding work carried out in SOCs. I then applied
more concepts from the AT theory to further understand the data. Thus a list of codes were
developed based on the AT model and performed data coding. New codes were added as new
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themes emerged. This continuous application of template analysis eventually resulted in one of the
major discoveries in this paper: the existence of contradictions in SOC operations and its key role
in preventing SOCs from doing an effective job.
6.6 Contradictions
A key feature that arises when using AT to study work environments is the notion of con-
tradictions. From AT perspectives, contradictions are defined as “a misfit within elements, be-
tween them, between different activities, or between different developmental phases of a single
activity” [26]. Some researchers have referred to contradictions as systemic tensions [27]. Other
definitions include “unintentional deviations from the script [which] cause disco-ordinations in in-
teraction” [28] and “problems, ruptures, breakdowns, clashes” in activities [26]. Engestro¨m [29]
even recognized contradictions as “the motive force of change and development” [22]. In a typical
scenario when contradictions arise, individual(s) begin to question the established norms and start
to deviate from the rules. A positive outcome is that individuals get together and develop a new
course of action that resolves the original contradiction leading to a better workflow [29].
6.7 Primary Contradictions
A tension that exists within a single node in the AT model (Figure 6.2) is called a primary
contradiction [15]. In a work environment, these tensions arise due to the dichotomy between the
“professional logic” of the employees and the “commercial logic” imposed by their organization [30].
The professional logic of security analysts (subject) dictates that they constantly improve their skills
and be efficient in detecting and mitigating security threats. On the other hand, SOCs are under
constant pressure to demonstrate their value to the parent organization. This results in a number
of metrics being defined to measure the performance of SOC analysts. Ultimately, the job of the
analysts is skewed very much towards generating those defined metrics. This creates a conflict
within them. They are confounded with two non-identical objectives – doing the right thing versus
the required thing.
Returning now to the incident response portal story, the analysts’ frustration was caused by
a conflict between their desire to continuously improve their skills and thus wanting to handle more
46
Table 6.1: Snapshot of Initial Template after Coding a Subset of Data
Theme Sub-themes Examples
Primary contradiction Subject Metrics define the job.
Secondary contradiction
Subject - Rules
Hinders creativity.
Unreasonable.
Subject - Instrument
Poor attribution.
Lack of customization.
Lack of analyst perspective.
Wrong assumptions.
Long tuning process.
Lack of visibility into tool functionality.
High learning curve.
Poor documentation.
Subject - Community
Misaligned priorities.
Pushback.
Division of labor - Object
Inflexible role assignments.
Lack of peer visibility.
intellectually challenging incidents, and the fact that SOC management emphasizes metrics such as
number of resolved incidents instead of the complexity or subtlety of the incidents. As an analyst
one has to tend to both these objectives which are often in conflict with each other. The analyst can
choose to close a high quantity of easy tickets (thereby scoring high marks on managerial metrics)
or attend to more complex incidents that may be more fulfilling. This leads to frustration and
eventually burnout. This contradiction is faced by the analysts within themselves; that is, it is a
contradiction that exists inherently in the “Subject” node of the AT triangle of Figure 6.2.
I went back to our field notes to find more examples of such primary contradictions. Following
the template analysis methodology, I coded our data with the initial goal of identifying contradic-
tions in the SOC’s operations. The initial template generated as a result of coding a subset of
the data is shown in Table 6.1. The initial template was then used to code the entire field notes,
resulting in the final template which was used to interpret the results. Some of the findings from
the analysis are illustrated below.
6.7.1 Primary Contradiction within Subject (Analyst)
In addition to the frustration we witnessed in the first SOC, this primary contradiction within
analysts is observed across the SOCs we studied.
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One analyst in a corporate SOC noted:
“I wanted to work in an environment where there will be continuous learning and
I have started to feel that I am not learning anything new in my current job. In fact,
I took the current job hoping to analyze malware every day and learn more in that
process. I feel that the SOC currently is not doing any real threat detection which in
turn is limiting my opportunities for learning. I have decided in my life, to spend a
significant amount of time for the improvement of my career. Now I feel bad that my
commitment is not paying off.”
In another instance a SOC manager asked his analysts to work towards generating metrics:
“There will be metrics collected for all analysts from the case management tool
(CMT) so that a report can be generated and shown to the upper management. If the
team has to scale, handling a number of cases, we need to produce numbers to show
to upper management. So far this is being done through success stories and this does
not scale as it looks very general. Some part of the management is also interested in
knowing the impact our team has on the infrastructure. Go over the metrics and say
which ones make sense and do not. You have to live with it and get involved. If you do
not get involved now then when the change is made into CMT you will have to provide
the data. I do not want to push it out there without questioning and for the sake of
doing it. I also want to measure the fidelity of the incident. Features in CMT that do
not lead to any metric must be removed.”
6.7.2 Primary Contradiction within Instrument (Tools)
Security analysts use a number of tools to perform their job. Some of them are physical such
as software and scripts, while others are cognitive, such as knowledge and training. In an ideal case
tools will help analysts become efficient in their job. From the professional-logic perspective this
is the true purpose of a tool. Interestingly, the tools in operation floors are purchased instead due
to reasons not aligned with efficiency. Typically the most expensive product in a SOC, SIEMs, are
purchased because they are considered information security “best practice.” Ironically, most of the
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SIEM solutions we saw deployed at the SOCs were not up to the task of basic event correlations
necessary for incident analysis, as illustrated in our incident response portal story. Here the com-
mercial logic for having the tool is compliance not operational efficiency, resulting in this primary
contradiction.
In one of the corporate SOCs, the management decided to use a particular case
management system (CMS) due to the support it provided with the existing SIEM
solution. While the integration seemed helpful at the beginning, the CMS turned out
not to fit the workflow of the SOC. The CMS was never replaced, which subsequently
lead to secondary contradictions with the analysts (Section 6.8.2).
6.7.3 Primary Contradiction within Rules (SOPs)
As noted earlier, the rules in SOCs are the standard operating procedures, or SOPs. The
purpose of SOPs is to make sure for a given incident every analyst will respond in a similar way.
In other words, they ensure predictability in operations. However, there is a fundamental conflict
that SOPs face which is between expected behavior and creativity of analysts. Security operation
is a distributed activity involving a number of analysts. If they are encouraged to act their own
way all the time there will be chaos. On the other hand, one does not know when to deviate from
the norm and try out new techniques. This inflexibility hinders detecting and mitigating threats
which are constantly adapting. This dualism is at the core of the conflict that exists within the
SOPs used in operations.
For example, an analyst encountered an operational scenario where he had to email a member
of a business units to validate an alert but was very hesitant to proceed. After waiting for a while
he contacted a senior analyst and asked him for advice on how to proceed. The junior analyst
specifically said that he did not know how to proceed as this scenario was not covered by any of
the procedures. This example demonstrates a familiar problem we encountered throughout our
fieldwork. While SOPs can empower an analyst within limits, the same SOPs can dis-empower the
analyst from acting beyond them.
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6.7.4 Primary Contradiction within Division of Labor
In work environments, the division of labor is achieved by assignment of roles to employees.
In a SOC typical roles include level-1&2, forensics, incident response, and content development
engineer. The role assignment ensures that people have the right skills and expertise for the assigned
task. There exists a dualism within division of work that leads to efficiency problems. The very
specific role assignments to analysts leads to analysts working in silos; thus they often lack empathy
for other analysts. On the other hand, analysts have to constantly work with their colleagues in
other roles; the lack of empathy creates barriers in this collaboration, thus fundamentally defeating
the purpose of division of labor.
For example, a level-1 analyst was frustrated about the high volume of events generated by
a rule written by a level-2 engineer:
“The engineering team is very stubborn. Jack (name changed) thinks that he knows
everything and does not understand the frustration of analysts.”
Likewise, upper-level analysts become frustrated by those in lower levels. Level-1&2 analysts
escalate incidents to incident response teams whenever they require assistance. One day the incident
response team members complained that they were getting too many escalations. Having worked
at both teams I found the two teams to be completely unaware of the priorities, problems, and
concerns of each other.
6.7.5 Primary Contradiction Within Objective
Finally, there is also a primary contradiction within the objective of the SOC itself. The
primary objective of the SOC as commonly understood is to detect and mitigate security threats
for their parent organization. Perversely, the better a SOC gets at detecting/preventing threats
the harder it becomes to show their value to the organization.
In one of the corporate SOCs alerts that were insignificant were deliberately left unoptimized
as optimization would reduce the number of alerts in the stream. Fewer alerts would then mean
that management would perceive that the SOC team could do their job with less number of analysts
and the parent organization would then put pressure on the SOC management to reduce the team
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size by laying off some of their analysts. As a result analysts have to deal with a large number of
useless events and eventually get worn out.
6.8 Secondary Contradictions
The existence of primary contradictions will also create conflicts between elements of the AT
model. In AT these are called secondary contradictions – tensions that exist between any pair of
nodes in the AT triangle of Figure 6.2. They are a manifestation of the inherent primary contradic-
tion within the single nodes [30]. Template analysis revealed a number of pair-wise contradictions
in SOCs.
6.8.1 Subject - Rules
A constant tension exists between the analysts and the standard operating procedures (SOPs)
they are required to follow. A security analyst wants to solve intellectually challenging security
incidents. This requires using novel analysis methods that are not in the SOPs. The SOP rules do
not provide enough freedom for an analyst as there is a written down procedure for every type of
incident. The mundane nature of executing procedures time and again hinders creativity. The rules
define the tasks of the analyst based on the opinion from the management. The SOC management
wanted the SOPs on the argument that SOPs help ensure predictable performance of the SOCs
(commercial logic). But at the same time this prevents the analysts from being creative in their
jobs (professional logic), and thus prevents them from being more efficient in operations. The
secondary contradiction, i.e., the conflicts between the subject (analysts) and the rule (SOPs), is a
manifestation of the primary contradictions inherent in the analysts and in the SOP as discussed
before. This secondary contradiction is also a main cause of the frustration at the first SOC we
worked at that eventually led us to develop the incident response portal to help address.
As one analyst in another SOC complained:
“The procedures were turning us into robots. The procedures were so detailed at
some point that all the analysts were doing was to click and fill in data.”
If not tended to, this contradiction has been found to cause adverse effects such as analyst
burnout leading to frequent turnovers, as pointed out earlier [7]. Periodic review of rules to identify
51
patterns that could be automated is one way to mitigate the effects of this contradiction, but this
is not done often enough (or at all) in most SOCs.
6.8.2 Subject - Instrument
From the perspective of technology transfer, this contradiction is the most interesting to
explore as it involves interaction of analysts with technology. The SOCs studied by myself and the
research team did not have the right tools to help their analysts as most of the tools were developed
without proper understanding of the analysts’ workflow. A top-down decision was made by the
management on the type of tools to be procured for the SOC. This is essentially a manifestation
of the primary contradiction within the tools (Section 6.7.2). As a result SOC tools have suffered
from a number of shortcomings.
One of the major concerns about the tools in SOCs pertains to poor attribution. To make
the best decision a security analyst must be provided with all the temporal and spatial information
related to an alert. The purchased tools were designed with no knowledge of operational workflows
and thus completely missed this aspect. Analysts were provided with partial information making
it hard to attribute the alert to an owner or a device. In another instances, analysts were not
able to query the wireless domain controller to extract the authenticated user IDs along with the
device host name because the vendor had not anticipated this need and decided not to provide
that feature. Such shortcomings result in analysts spending most of their time performing low-level
data processing tasks to gather the missing information, rather than creative investigation.
6.8.3 Division of Labor - Instrument
A SOC is comprised of analysts with specific role assignments. In order to achieve the goal
of division of labor, where analysts perform the tasks they are good at, it is imperative that they
have the right tools to assist them. The preference for features in a tool depends upon the role
and technical expertise of the analyst. A forensic analyst might like to use a Linux desktop and
might be comfortable using a command-line interface. A compliance analyst whose primary task
is to check for conformation of systems to rules might be comfortable only with a graphical user
interface (GUI). Tools are oftentimes purchased based on the managerial logic that interferes with
the preferences and requirements of the analysts (Section 6.7.2). As a result, analysts in different
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roles could not accomplish their tasks and the purpose of dividing work based on expertise is
defeated.
This contradiction is well illustrated by the story of incident response portal. After the tool
was built, the process of responding to the malware incidents was simplified to the point that it
could be handed off to the Network Operations Center (NOC) of the university. The NOC analysts
were less skilled compared to the SOC staff and their job was to handle cognitively less intensive
tasks. Our tool, however efficient in handling malware alerts, was not ready to be used by the NOC
staff simply because it used a command line interface. The conflict our tool ran into was between
Division of Labor (skill set of analysts) and Instrument (tools they had to use). The incident
response portal exposed an interface that required more cognitive work than the NOC analysts are
comfortable with. As a result, the SOC’s effort to transfer this task to NOC did not happen for
a long time, and the more skilled SOC analysts were still stuck performing the mundane ticketing
task for malware incidents (though more efficiently than before).
I resolved this contradiction by providing an alternate web interface to the portal in addition
to the command line access for SOC staff. The web interface abstracted away a number of technical
tasks and pushed them into the background. The NOC staff were then able to file malware tickets
at the push of a button. Clearly, the same tool needs to have multiple interfaces depending on the
type of analysts who will be using it. Otherwise one cannot get the expected benefit of distributing
work among analysts.
It is important to note that this is also an example of how an attempt to resolve one contra-
diction may create a new contradiction. The tool was originally designed to improve the work of
SOC analysts, but it ultimately had an impact on the division of labor, being accepted as a tool
for the NOC. But here the tool failed because it had been designed with a command-line interface
for the SOC. This highlights the fact that conflicts will keep emerging in a SOC no matter how
much you can do to improve its process. Such conflicts must be resolved on a continuous basis.
6.9 From Contradictions to Innovations
The previous section discussed the contradictions identified in SOCs during my anthropolog-
ical study. Each contradiction requires a different course of action to be resolved. Some measures
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are technical while others are managerial. The rest are influenced by economic considerations. This
leads to a question of particular interest to the computer science community: Can technologists do
something to turn some of the contradictions into innovations? If so, how?
Contradictions are at the heart of Activity Theory and they are the potential triggers for
workplace innovations [15, 22]. When I looked back at my fieldwork data I realized that it was
by identifying and resolving certain contradictions that I succeeded in bringing an innovation to
security operations.
Let us return once again to the incident response portal story. The analysts were stuck
performing a high volume repetitive task. Neither the analysts nor the field workers could invest
time in any creative security projects because the repetitive malware incidents had to be taken care
of as high priority. The analysts would get penalized if they did not close the malware tickets in a
timely fashion as required by their manager. They have to balance between two conflicting motives
of their job: engage in creative security analysis, and resolve the constant stream of incoming
security alerts. The presence or lack of the right tool will either reconcile or aggravate the two
contradictory motives. The incident response portal we built resolved/mitigated a number of
contradictions manifested in this story.
My tool was built in the context of the SOC environment and hence fits the operational work-
flow. The tool development process is analyst-developer co-creation. In this model the fieldworkers
are also analysts themselves, and they engage in developing tools that aid in analysts’ work. As
fieldworkers, we switched hats between developer and analyst to enable co-creation within ourselves.
This addressed the secondary contradiction of tools falling short of analysts’ expectations (Subject
- Instrument in Section 6.8.2). The incident response portal reduced the ticketing time from 10min
to 10sec, allowing the analysts to close the immediate incidents more quickly. As a result they will
have more time for creative analysis. Therefore the incident response portal mitigated the primary
contradiction within the analysts (Section 6.7.1), since they can now more easily balance the two
conflicting objectives of their job. The tool also mitigated the primary contradiction within the
tools (Section 6.7.2). While the SIEM used by the SOC (considered a must-have due to “best
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practice”) was not up to the task, the incident response portal bridged this gap by introducing
some real value (helping analysts in their job) into the SOC’s tool box.
I continued to conduct template analysis on the field notes to revisit all the cases when we
built tools for SOCs. Every one of them confirmed that the reason the tools we built were adopted
by a SOC and became useful was because they all helped resolve some contradictions in the SOC.
They will keep being useful and used by the SOC as long as we continue updating the tool to
resolve new contradictions as they emerge (including contradictions that emerge in part due to the
tool itself). If we stop the process of identifying/resolving contradictions, the tool will stop being
used in the SOC.
After combing through all the success and failure stories of our tools in the SOCs we studied,
we further realized that the process of resolving contradictions in a SOC can be placed in the
proper perspective by looking at another important aspect of activity theory – the dynamic nature
of activity.
6.10 Human Activity Dynamics
Humans performing an activity operate at multiple cognitive levels in achieving their ob-
jective. Let us look at an example by Kaptelinin et al.to give further insight into this hierarchy
of activity [23]. The example sheds light on the non-stationary nature of the hierarchy, i.e., the
hierarchy evolves over time and the importance of specific actions shifts. Consider the activity
of learning to drive a car. For the first few days, the learner consciously performs tasks such as
changing lanes, looking in the mirrors, and shifting gears. Each of these in AT terms is called an
action. Broadly, human tasks that require explicit attention are categorized as actions. The high
level of cognitive effort required by each activity prevents the learner from multitasking during
the learning period. With practice and continued instruction, the actions become second nature
and can be performed subconsciously. At this point, they become internalized and are now called
operations. The cognitive effort needed to perform operations is almost negligible, thereby enabling
multitasking. The ability to perform operations persists even after years of non use. One never
forgets how to ride a bicycle2.
2There is a neurological explanation for this. See http://www.abdn.ac.uk/news/3275/.
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6.11 Hierarchical Nature of Activity
According to AT, human activity can be organized into a hierarchy of levels. This idea is often
illustrated using a classical example from Leont’ev [31]. He differentiates between two different types
of objects that come into play when people are engaged in socially distributed activities. Usually
there is a motivating object that inspires the people to perform a particular activity and there is a
directing object that is more immediate and guides them towards the motivating object. He explains
this distinction using the example of hunting. When hunting together, people are divided into two
groups: one that scares the animals by beating the bushes. These are called the beaters. The other
group, called the ambushers (or shooters in current terminology) waits for the scared animals to
come towards them so they can kill them. The original motivating object for the collective activity
was food. An outsider positioned to examine only the activities of one group would find them
difficult to fathom. The game is often well in advance of the beaters and might not be visible to
an observer following them. The ambushers appear to be waiting idly, as they must be in position
before the beaters start their drive. It is only when the observer discerns the relationship between
the two groups that the hunt becomes apparent.
Figure 6.3 shows three levels in the hierarchy of human activity [23]. This abstraction can
be adapted to fit any context. At the top level is the activity itself which is guided by the motive.
The activity is broken down into sub-units called actions. The actions are motivated by goals that,
seen in isolation, may appear to have nothing to do with the overall motive of the activity e.g., the
action of beaters may appear to have nothing to do with the overall motive of hunting. Each action
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Figure 6.4: Pentagon Model for Knowledge Transformation
is then decomposed into further smaller units called operations. Operations are in fact actions
that have been customized to the environment under which they are carried out. The distinction
between an action and an operation is that one may be aware of the fact that they are performing
an action while an operation is a subconscious routinized task.
Let us now look at the process carried out by us when turning some of the contradictions in
security operations into innovations, through the lens of the hierarchical model of human activities.
6.11.1 Activity in Security Operations
I found the action-operation dynamics to be applicable to tasks performed by security an-
alysts. Steps such as log analysis, filing incident tickets, and communicating with stakeholders,
when performed consciously by an analyst can be categorized as actions. After repeated appli-
cations these steps can be internalized within an analyst and be performed with very minimal
cognitive effort, at which time they become operations. My template analysis revealed that the
action-operation transition in SOCs involves some interesting aspects of knowledge transformation.
Specifically, the analysis identified three additional stages in this transition that are not present
in the traditional AT literature. Figure 6.4 shows what I call the pentagon model for knowledge
transformation in SOCs. The five stages of activity repeat as a cycle; each stage is described below.
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1. Acting: Analysts in the acting stage are handling a new security incident, e.g., a zero day
or previously unidentified incident. A new incident does not have an SOP or other written
procedures for its handling. As a result, the analysts have to consciously perform each step of
the investigation. This stage requires a creative mindset and demands a high cognitive effort
from analysts.
2. Proceduralizing: Once analysts understand the incident, they develop a procedure for handling
similar incidents. Documentation needs to be written describing the procedure. This ensures
that other team members are aware of the new incident handling process and preserves the
knowledge. This is one of the newly identified stages of the activity hierarchy. Because
documenting the procedure usually requires multiple iterations and is a cognitive activity
distinct from handling the original incident, it deserves its own place in the hierarchy.
3. Operating: The operating stage occurs when the procedure for handling the new incident is
mature and predictable enough for the analyst to perform it subconsciously. There is a self-
contradictory nature to this stage. On the one hand, the cognitive effort needed to perform
the procedure has become minimal or nonexistent. On the other hand, when the analysts are
in the repetitive operating mode (for periods of days) they do nothing creative. This can lead
to severe problems such as burnout [7] and partially explains the high turnover rate among
SOC analysts, unless a separate set of people with suitable personalities are tasked with this
job.
4. Reflecting: This is the second of the three new stages of the SOC activity I identified. Reflec-
tion is a process whereby analysts identify aspects of the operational tasks that have become
repetitive and require little or no cognitive effort. These are candidates for automation or
for delegating to a lesser skilled organization. In a highly efficient SOC, this is performed as
often as once a month. I have observed operational environments where no reflection takes
place. Analyst burnout and a high turnover are more common in these environments.
5. Scripting: In the scripting stage analysts, either themselves or by working with a develop-
ment team, automate aspects of incident handling that have been identified as candidates for
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automation in the reflection process. Usually these are scripts written in rapid development
languages such as Python or Ruby. However, implementation can also be done via long-term
developmental efforts using web frameworks or coding in a lower level language. This is the
third new stage I identified in the SOC activity.
6.11.2 Automation and Conflict Resolution Revisited
Every new analytical task starts being performed consciously by an analyst (acting). The
task then, after some stabilization, is documented as an SOP (proceduralizing). The stabilized task
is eventually internalized by analysts (operating). Most SOC managers and analysts stop at this
stage. As explained in the previous sections, this will result in primary and secondary contradictions
within and between analysts, their tools, and SOPs, leading to frustration and burnout. Let us
look back at the contradictions we saw in the incident response portal story. The analysts got
frustrated and burned out because they were stuck in the operation stage and did not have any
time to think about new threats and problems. Automation of the repetitive operations resolved
this contradiction and allowed the analysts to move from the operation stage to the acting stage.
This also allowed for the analysts to be more prepared to deal with new threats.
Unfortunately, my fieldwork finds that the process of incremental automation in SOCs is
predominantly reactive. Scripts are written only in response to high workload, such as when the
volume of an alert stream is too high. I propose that senior analysts and managers should conduct
periodic reviews of analytical tasks and identify those that have been operationalized within the
analysts. In other words, the review should focus on identifying aspects of SOPs that have become
cognitively repetitive for the analysts. Those tasks could then be automated proactively by either
the analysts or software developers with the requirements provided by the analysts. Our incident
response portal is an outcome of such a process. Tools created this way will fit well within the
cognitive analytical process of analysts and free them to perform more creative tasks.
The pentagon model is also well aligned with the nature of detecting and responding to cyber
threats. The variety of security threats evolve rapidly these days demanding creative analysis. Ana-
lysts must remain in the conscious acting stage as much as possible to be effective. Tools developed
following the pentagon model are not static. The constraints that determined the requirements
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of the tool might change creating new conflicts. This will first push the tasks back to the acting
stage demanding manual intervention by analysts and developers. Using the co-creation process,
the tool can be adapted to resolve the new conflicts by going through the reflecting and scripting
stage again.
6.11.3 Implications of Pentagon Model for Analyst Burnout
The net effect of the cycle in the pentagon model is to recognize that a new incident serves
as a potential harbinger for a flood of similar incidents to come. Converting its mitigation from a
challenging cognitive task to something that can be oﬄoaded or automated, frees the more capable
analysts to meet the next challenge. Thus the cycle repeats. There is another potential problem
that we identified in the model – the rate of transition from the scripting to the acting stages. If
the arrival rate of new incidents exceeds the rate of the cycle time in the model, burnout may occur
despite the cognitive challenges, due to the lack of time to automate the operation. If the arrival
rate of new incidents is much lower than the rate of the cycle time, burnout may be supplanted by
boredom which also leads to a high turnover.
6.12 Tools and Beyond
The incident response portal was part of a broader workflow innovation process. The tool
would have no meaning if one removed the objective the SOC wanted to attain using that tool.
The SOC wanted to implement a hierarchy in the operational workflow. Its staff is composed of
highly skilled analysts but a small team. They wanted their job to become investigating novel
incidents and devising mitigation plans to deal with similar events in the future. They could then
write down an SOP document listing out the steps that should be taken to respond to each of the
novel incidents. Once the response steps have become stable enough and highly repetitive, they can
then transfer it to teams composed of less skilled analysts such as the Network Operations Center
(NOC). This ideal did not happen until myself and other fieldworkers helped the SOC identify and
resolve a number of contradictions in their workflows by building the incident response portal.
It is within this background that the development and deployment of operational tools must
be viewed. Hence it is appropriate to say that resolving contradictions is a prerequisite for not
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just developing successful operational tools, but to implement any novel idea in SOCs. And due to
the complex activity system in which tools and new ideas are deployed, they must be continually
updated and re-adapted to address new and emergent contradictions, some of which are created by
the innovation itself.
6.12.1 Conflict Resolution is a Sensitive Process
Identifying and turning contradictions into useful innovations is a challenging task. The
chance of a contradiction becoming a useful workflow improvement depends largely on first ac-
knowledging the contradiction [32]. Many contradictions go unnoticed due to a variety of factors
including lack of management support or denial by those affected. During the fieldwork we ob-
served many contradictions that were never spoken of by L-1 analysts fearing repercussions. It
has been observed that turning a contradiction into an innovation does not happen only at an
individual level. A collective effort by the community is needed and tools used by the community
may need to be transformed together to enable the innovation [33]. The incident response portal
required collaborative effort from the analysts and fieldworkers who acted as analyst/developer.
The tool’s development required the approval of the SOC manager who allowed the analysts to
spend their work time in the co-creation process. Due to different roles and objectives within the
activity system, it may be difficult to achieve sufficient consensus around an innovation. Sometimes
contradictions are not openly discussed because they are just embarrassing [34]. SOC analysts fre-
quently encounter security breaches; discussing the problems in handling security incidents with
other people will put them in a bad light.
In this work, the use of anthropological methods helped me earn the trust of analysts in
discussing embarrassing or otherwise undiscussable contradictions. Working as an analyst I was
able to experience the contradictions first hand. It becomes clear that building trust among analysts
and between various SOC teams is a key enabler for acknowledging and discussing contradictions,
and is thus a pre-requisite for bringing about useful innovations to SOCs. SOC managers must view
friction in operations as opportunities for making things better rather than simply reprimanding
the analysts. Above all, managers should earn the trust of their analysts and be a participant
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in the conflict resolution process as they are the authoritative persons to bring actual changes to
operations.
6.12.2 Conflict Resolution is a Continuous Process
As mentioned in Section 6.3, I returned to the SOC where the incident response portal was
deployed after a brief hiatus of a few months. To my surprise found that the tool was shelved
and not used by SOC or the NOC staff. After resuming my fieldwork, which involved continued
co-creation, the tool once again was adopted into daily operations by the analysts. Reflecting back
on this experience, the incident response portal was temporarily out of operations due to the hiatus
in conflict resolution when myself and other fieldworkers were absent in the SOC. This led me to
the realization that successful tools must address contradictions on a continuous basis for their
continued usefulness. This explains why the SIEM solution at this SOC (and at other SOCs we
studied), which was essentially a static tool, was barely functional. In short, human activity is a
dynamic system. If a tool is to be and remain effective, it must also be dynamic.
6.13 Discussion
My conclusion that useful tools for SOCs must help resolve the various contradictions in the
work environment on a continuous basis seems to be at odds with how security product vendors
produce technologies these days. Many vendors still view this as a “build-once-sell-to-everyone”
market, without much understanding of the variations in the workflows and contradictions that may
arise within the various SOCs they tend to sell the products to. My research results imply that tools
built this way will not work effectively to help SOC analysts. It seems to follow that useful security
tools for SOCs may best be built within SOCs, by people who can identify and understand the
contradictions within the work environments. My experience in the anthropological study shows
that to achieve this understanding, it takes a person becoming an analyst and doing the job in the
SOC.
The proposed pentagon model highlights the importance of the “reflecting” and “scripting”
stages in SOCs. Unfortunately oftentimes SOC management does not understand the importance
of automation and does not allocate enough work force to ensure analysts have time to perform
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reflection and automation. As a result the analysts are stuck in operation mode, leading to burnout.
On the other hand, when the event rate is low, simulation-based approaches could be used to
generate events that turn analysts to the acting mode when there are not enough real interesting
events.
The ability of analysts to transition to acting stage in the pentagon model depends on their
skill set to do rapid software prototyping. The fieldworkers in this research were skilled program-
mers, and at the same time security analysts. This allowed them to develop tools that automate
the operations. A typical analyst has two problems when it comes to developing quality tools. The
first issue arises from a lack of time to write code. In operations, priority is given to handling
incidents and responding to tickets. A large number of events per analyst means that analysts do
not get the right amount of time to write software, and are not even encouraged to do so. The
second issue is that some analysts just do not have the skills to program. As discussed above, good
tools can be written only when you actually do the job. This implies that the analysts may be the
right people to develop the required tools, which begs the question of whether programming ability
should be a desired qualification for SOC analysts.
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CHAPTER 7 : STUDYING TACIT KNOWLEDGE USING ANTHROPOLOGY
Anthropological principles have been applied to study tacit knowledge in other work environ-
ments in the past. One of the noteworthy efforts was the study of Vai and Gola tailors of Liberia
by anthropologist Jean Lave [35]. She found young aspirants who wish to become tailors had to go
through an apprenticeship process. The young apprentice would work with an experienced tailor
performing basic tasks such as cloth cutting. The apprentice in an early stage is not fully trusted
to perform a clean job and said to be in peripheral participation mode. The novice slowly learns
various nuances from masters and gets involved in complicated tasks such as stitching buttons, at
which point the apprentice is said to have moved on to complete participation in the profession.
The key to transition from being a novice to a professional tailor was to acquire those nuances or
tacit knowledge in tailoring from a master. Most notably, there is no explicit instruction from a
master instructing the apprentice to stitch or cut clothes in a certain manner.
Lave’s student Etienne Wenger extended the apprenticeship model to study knowledge man-
agement in organizations [36]. Together they developed the notion of “communities of practice,”
which challenged common perceptions about knowledge in general. They found that knowledge in
professional settings (1) may not always be explicitly written down; (2) is embedded or “embodied
in practice;” and most interestingly, (3) that knowledge has a social dimension in that no individual
could be said to possess the knowledge but that it is embedded within the community practicing
the profession [35]. It thus appears that knowledge in professional environments is not always found
in manuals and wiki pages. Professional knowledge is tacit and distributed among members of the
organization. Thus to study knowledge embedded in a community it follows naturally that one has
to become a member of the community.
Lave and Wenger’s work was later extended by many other researchers to study knowledge
generation and management in organizations. Of specific interest to us is Ikujiro Nonaka’s model
for knowledge conversion [37]. Nonaka’s model explains the process by which an incoming novice
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employee becomes an expert over time. The model proposes a four step continuous process for
knowledge capture, creation, and transformation:
1. Socialization is the process where professional knowledge is transferred through apprentice-
ship, observation, imitation, and practice. The transmitted knowledge is from tacit dimension
of the master to tacit dimension of the recipient. This is the learning-by-doing method of
training.
2. Externalization is the step in which members try to codify their tacit knowledge into explicit
forms such as documents and manuals. Tacit knowledge is hard to codify and hence this step
is crucial for a successful knowledge capture process. One way to achieve externalization is
through periodic conscious reflection of work practices.
3. Combination is perhaps the most straightforward of the four steps. Knowledge in documents
and manuals (explicit form) are combined in various forms to create derived knowledge that
is then recorded to create new knowledge. This can be achieved through periodic review of
documentation in wiki pages and manuals.
4. Internalization is one in which members of the community interact with the documented
explicit knowledge, which can alter or enrich their internal tacit knowledge. This is a cognitive
activity happening within the minds of people.
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The four stages of Nonaka’s model lead to continuous generation of new knowledge that once
again gets transformed through the four steps. Thus knowledge is continuously generated and
transformed from one form to another through human interactions in organizations. To tap into
this knowledge one has to get involved in the process.
7.1 Studying Tacit Knowledge in SOCs
The original intended goal of this research was to study tacit knowledge embedded among
SOC analysts and use it to develop practical and usable security solutions. Findings from the first
three years of my study help understand the social and organizational constraints of SOC operations.
I took up job as a security analyst at a SOC belonging to a multinational IT organization during
my fourth year of the study (July 2017). The hope was to access operational tacit knowledge to
build usable and useful operational tools. The SOC was a Level-2 (L-2) environment processing
tickets escalated from a level-1 service provider. Typical tasks of a L-2 analyst involves deep-dive
analysis of escalated incidents and establishing root cause in order to deploy effective controls. I
worked as and alongside analysts in the SOC analyzing log data and assisting in investigations.
Performing tasks of an analyst is an important first step in capturing their tacit knowledge. I also
made detailed field notes on human, organizational, and technical aspects of daily SOC activities.
While there have been a wide range of formulation of tacit knowledge [38], I would like to
highlight two notions of tacit knowledge that is relevant to my work:
• that within an individual analyst: A security analyst often makes subconscious decisions in
analyzing security incidents. The process is almost reflexive due to years of performing tasks
in a repetitive fashion. They can perform those tasks almost automatically because they
have absorbed the context of the organization, which includes flow of traffic, type of threats,
behavior of users, and many others that are typical to the organization.
• that embedded in the SOC as a whole: For example, in triaging a host for a malware infection
no single analyst can conclusively point out the nature and severity of the threat. Then the
entire team comes together with inputs on different aspects such as the user behavior, host
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behavior, etc.Quite interestingly the severity of the situation is quickly assessed through this
group work.
I focused on identifying tacit knowledge at both individual and collective levels in our work. I
started as an apprentice at the SOC working with experienced analysts. Through the socialization
process in Nonaka’s model, the initial operational knowledge was transferred from expert analysts
to myself. I then performed conscious reflection of my activities by documenting daily tasks in the
form of fieldnotes as part of the externalization process. Conscious reflection helped me to develop
a contextual understanding of the organization’s security posture. This was due to the combination
of explicit knowledge documented in the fieldnotes. I went through Nonaka’s model for two months,
at which point I observed that the SOC was facing some operational challenges. The problem was
one well known to the security communities. It was detecting phishing campaigns. In the rest of
the paper the phishing problem is used as a running example to demonstrate the tacit knowledge
capture process.
7.2 The SOC Phishing Problem
Email is still one of the most preferred attack vectors to compromise end user’s system.
In a typical scenario, employees of an organization receive emails that contain malicious links or
attachments. Unsuspecting users accessing links or attachments will end up installing malware
that can steal credential information after compromising their devices. Attackers were using macro
embedded Microsoft Word (MS-Word) documents to deliver malware into enterprise hosts. The
SOC did not have an efficient defense mechanism to protect their users from phishing campaigns.
Almost all the time the SOC became aware of a campaign only via user reporting. By the time a
careful user reports to the SOC, hundreds of other users would have fallen victim for the attack.
The threat was also leading to financial and productivity loss to the organization. Employees
sometimes transfered money to an attacker’s account after falling to phishing scams that claim to
be invoices. They would also get infected with ransomware that locked them out of their systems.
I spotted an opportunity to apply my experience in security research and training in anthropology
to help solve this problem.
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7.3 Defense Point of View
SOC analysts have been performing manual triage of phishing emails for years at the SOC.
My first step towards solving the phishing problem was to view the problem from the analysts’
point of view. Based on the principles of participant observation, I had to work with the analysts
on phishing cases myself, so that I can look through the eyes of the analysts, to capture their tacit
knowledge. I started by looking at user reports about phishing incidents and the response taken
by the analysts. After a month or so I was able to identify concrete steps the analysts took while
responding to phishing incidents.
• Obtain complete information about the suspicious email including headers.
• Extract signatures such as sender email and IP address, subject, and file names.
• Use signatures to search email repository for any other users who might have received similar
phishing emails.
• Issue block requests for indicators, such as URLs, to contain the infection.
I was able to elicit the steps of this process after going through two stages of the Nonaka
model. First, I socialized with the analysts by becoming one among them; this led to the transfer
of tacit knowledge related to phishing detection. I then proceeded to the externalization stage
where I made detailed fieldnotes of daily activities related to phishing email triage. I engaged in a
conscious reflection process along with the extended research team to externalize this knowledge.
After a month or so I was able to view the problem from the analysts’ perspective.
The existing phishing detection/prevention mechanisms in the SOC failed because the process
was reactive and it took too long for the SOC to create a mitigation for a new phishing campaign.
For example, the SOC received threat reports on various indicators of compromise (IOCs) that are
indicative of phishing attack. The reports are usually received on a weekly basis and it is already
too late by then. At this point I had obtained an emic or insider perspective into the phishing
problem faced by the SOC. Equipped with the tacit knowledge on detecting a phishing email I
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proceeded to develop a tool to help the SOC in phishing detection. Based on the understanding of
the problem, the tool had to satisfy the following constraints:
• Phishing emails have to be detected in real-time or near real-time to protect end users.
• The tool must be self adaptive. Any detection mechanism must be able to identify phishing
emails as the attack vector evolves.
• A SOC is a busy place with daily routine tasks and hence the tool must require minimal to
no human intervention to operate.
• The tool must be able to identify groups of similar phishing emails or campaigns and provide
indicators of compromise (IOCs) on a per campaign basis. Grouping emails this way ensures
that analysts’ time is used in the most effective way.
7.4 The Hunch
I started working with SOC analysts on developing the tool. The study data was multi-
dimensional comprising of both benign and phishing emails. We studied historical cases of phishing
campaigns to better understand the problem. Then we studied emails in real-time as they arrived
to further refine our understanding. We had our first hunch that there was some similarity among
the phishing emails. Quite interestingly, none of us was able to concretely express the actual
similarity among those emails. All we could allude to was that phishing emails seem to have some
commonality. Working purely from a defense perspective, we started grouping emails by various
combination of attributes. We tried using EXIF fields of MS-Word attachments such as lines and
paragraphs as features. We had seen campaigns in the past that contained zero lines and paragraphs
in their EXIF fields and thought that would distinguish benign documents from malicious ones.
We were not successful at this attempt as the features turned out to be too noisy. Following the
hunch we tried combination of other features including email headers. We still could not narrow
down to the right feature combination that grouped phishing campaigns together.
Later, I realized the features chosen by us did not reflect attackers’ purpose. We picked
features that we assumed indicated a similarity among phishing emails. Myself and fellow analysts
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realized we had to study the problem from attackers’ perspective if we had to make progress. In
other words, I had to attain the native point of view of an attacker to make progress in developing
a solution to the problem.
7.5 Attacker Point of View
The purpose of attaining attackers’ point of view was to uncover their tactics, technique, and
procedures (TTPs) for phishing campaigns. I could not obviously live with the attackers but had
access to phishing emails to study their modus operandi. The study data comprised of 267,214
emails with MS-Word 2003 attachments received between July to October 2016. We studied the
emails on a real-time basis as they arrived into the SOC. Every week we acquired tacit insights,
which were then made explicit through the externalization process. Referring back to Nonaka’s
model the cycle is repeated to generate further tacit and explicit knowledge. After a few iterations,
I could perceive the phishing phenomenon from an attacker’s perspective.
7.5.1 Choose an Effective Attack Vector
In a typical phishing campaign, an attacker first designs a malicious website that looks similar
to trusted sites such as a popular bank. He then crafts emails with links to the malicious website and
sends them to internet users. If users are not careful, they sign into the website giving away their
banking credentials. However, this method is ineffective for an attacker. Link based phishing can
easily be defeated by simple URL sharing through portals such as PhishTank [39]. Hence, attackers
have started using Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros inside MS-Word documents in
phishing emails. Phishing based on VBA macros are not new and the earliest ones could be traced
back to the Melissa email worm in 1999.
VBA is a full-fledged programming language designed to enhance functionality of MS-Office
applications. Unfortunately, the capability is being misused by cyber-criminals to embed code that
performs malicious activity on user computers. In a typical phishing scenario using VBA macros,
the attacker embeds code that reaches out to internet and downloads payload from a Command &
Control (C&C) server. The downloaded code will install further malware such as keyloggers that
attempt to retrieve sensitive information such as credit card numbers. Further, the attacker will
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enable the macro to auto-execute as soon as the Word document is opened. Attachment based
phishing also provides more access to users’ devices compared to link based phishing, and is easier
to get past perimeter defense mechanisms. At this point I understood the mechanism used by
attackers to gain initial access to user devices.
7.5.2 Defeat Cost-effective Defenses
Further analysis of phishing emails revealed additional interesting trends about attackers’
tactics. In the five months of emails, there were 10,803 unique macro enabled malware documents.
99.94% of those documents appeared in only one campaign. Similarly, attackers sent phishing
campaigns using 6,138 unique email addresses. 91.4% of email addresses were seen in only one
campaign. From the attackers’ perspective, by minimizing reuse of attack artifacts he could defeat
cost-effective defenses such as sharing list of email addresses and file hashes.
For the purpose of this work, a campaign is defined as a wave of phishing emails encoding
same VBA macro code. I identified 75 phishing campaigns over the five month period. Of the 75,
only nine were duplicates and all the others are “singleton campaigns.” This observation indicated
that attackers were rarely reusing exploit codes across campaigns. I also believe that the duplicates
were due to multiple waves of the same campaign.
At this point, it became clear to me and other SOC analysts that they cannot deploy IOC
based defenses to solve the phishing problem.
7.5.3 Increase Return on Investment (ROI)
Attackers are humans with resource constraints. They want to obtain maximum benefit for
their efforts. In the case of phishing, an attacker writes a VBA exploit and tries to infect as
many users as possible to obtain maximum return. We show anonymized version of three different
phishing campaigns in Figures 7.2,7.3,7.4. Within each campaign, the values of the three fields
mailer, filename, and subject have very little variance. Similar pattern was observed in all the
phishing campaigns we studied. A reasonable hypothesis seems to be that the attacker has written
a script to automate mass distribution of email messages. They can obtain a list of potential target
email addresses from LinkedIn and Facebook profiles. They then set those three fields to a certain
combination and the script personalizes the email for each target based on certain attributes, e.g.,
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Figure 7.2: Campaign-I
Figure 7.3: Campaign-II
first name obtained from the email address. Once the attackers’ ROI got decoded we got closer to
attackers’ vision of the phishing problem.
7.6 Reconciling Defender and Attacker Views
After viewing the phishing problem both as a defender and an attacker, I realized why our
prior efforts failed. The initial hunch indicated some grouping exists among emails within a phishing
campaign, but we were randomly trying out different feature combinations to group those emails.
The problem was still being perceived purely from a defender’s perspective. The features did not
reflect attackers’ operating constraints. The eureka moment was when myself and team identified
the ROI constraints of attackers. Following that train of thought, we realized that emails could
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Figure 7.4: Campaign-III
be grouped on the three features (mailer, subject, and filename) that tend to be consistent within
a campaign, since likely the attackers will have to automatically fill in those fields for mass dis-
tribution. Randomization of those fields will not work. For example, a randomized file name or
subject in an email can easily arouse users’ suspicion. The problem must be studied from the view
point of both defender and attacker, and the two must be reconciled in order to design a successful
solution. I worked with fellow analysts on designing a software framework called PhishNet based
on the gathered insights.
7.7 PhishNet Architecture
This section gives a high-level overview of the PhishNet software framework. Before I arrived,
the SOC analysts already built an email collection mechanism. The Microsoft Exchange Server used
in the corporation was set up to forward a copy of every received email to a Python process running
in a Linux host. The Python program parses each incoming email and extracts the metadata and
attachment headers. The extracted features were constructed as an event and sent to a security
information and event management (SIEM) system used in the SOC.
I leveraged this existing infrastructure to construct a new phishing email detection approach.
Phishing emails must be detected as soon as possible to warn the users in a timely manner. However,
none of the commercial or in-house tools at the SOC had this capability.
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Figure 7.5: PhishNet Architecture
The new program developed by us queries the SIEM periodically for all emails containing
MS Word-2003 attachments. The querying frequency is configurable and was set to one day in our
pilot run. Each email gets transformed into a concatenation of three extracted features – mailer,
subject, and attachment file name – forming the feature vectors. Closely related feature vectors
are organized into the same group using K-Means clustering algorithm. The program further vets
the clusters based on certain properties of phishing emails; this produces clusters of potentially
malicious phishing campaigns. As a final step features of VBA macros are extracted from each
malicious cluster as indicators of compromise (IOCs); clusters that contain the same IOCs are
coalesced into a single campaign. The following subsections explain each of the components of the
PhishNet framework in detail.
7.7.1 Feature Extraction
Empirical analysis from attacker point of view indicated a very high correlation among the
three features among emails in the same phishing campaign. As shown in Section 7.5 the three
features are mailer, subject, and attachment file name. The campaign authors design a VBA macro
based exploit and send it to multiple recipients in order to maximize their return-on-investment
(ROI). To facilitate this they might be using a software program or a script to send out mass emails
to potential victims. In doing so, they introduce only slight perturbations on those three features.
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Based on this key observation, we transform each email into a string that is a concatenation of the
three features. Two transformations on the string are performed for better accuracy:
1. Tokenizing Given a string the tokenizer returns list of words with the stop words1 removed.
2. Stemming Given a word the stemming process reduces it to a root word. For example, payment
will be reduced to pay by a stemmer. This step removes semantic variations introduced by
the attacker.
7.7.2 TF-IDF Matrix Construction
The problem of grouping similar emails is reduced into a text clustering problem. To per-
form text clustering term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) matrix construction that
is extensively used in text mining and information retrieval [40] is leveraged. The intuition behind
the scheme is to assign a weight to every document-term pair. The weight is proportional to the
frequency of the term occuring in the document and specificity of the term across all documents.
As a result, a term that occurs in high frequency within a given document but in low frequen-
cies in other documents will get a higher score for that document. Formally, the weight for each
document-term pair is calculated as follows.
1. Term Frequency (TF) The TF value of a term quantifies the popularity of the term within a
document.
TF(d, t) =
Number of occurrences t in d
Total number of terms in d
2. Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) The IDF value measures the specificity of a term. Intu-
itively, we would like to assign a higher value to terms that occur exclusively in a few given
documents and lower value to terms that occur in many documents.
IDF(t) = log
Total number of documents
Number of documents that contain t
The final TF-IDF score for each document-term pair is calculated as follows.
TF-IDF(d, t) = TF(d, t) ∗ IDF(t)
1Words that have little semantic meaning, including articles and prepositions.
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7.7.3 Clustering
With all emails now converted into a tf-idf matrix we can cluster them into groups to separate
different phishing campaigns. Our empirical analysis indicated that the grouping will also cluster
benign emails into various clusters, since some benign emails also have predictable patterns, e.g.,
job applications. I use K-Means algorithm to cluster tf-idf representation of the email features.
However, a challenge in using K-Means is to know in advance the optimal value for the number
of clusters k. Phishing campaigns are dynamic in nature and so are the benign emails. Hence we
needed a way to automatically compute an approximate value for k in a dynamic fashion and use
that to cluster the tf-idf matrix. I would like to reiterate that the dynamic nature of campaigns
and similarity among benign emails came to light only after my fieldwork.
Can et al. [41] proposed a probabilistic method to estimate the approximate number of clusters
given a set of documents. They use the tf-idf representation of the documents and calculate the
number clusters. Assume a tf-idf matrix of d documents and t terms. Let nz be the number of cells
that have non-zero values.
One can estimate the approximate number of document clusters using the following equation:
# of clusters =
d ∗ t
nz
In PhishNet we estimate the number of clusters from the tf-idf matrix before the clustering
process.
7.7.4 Filtering
The clustering process identifies groups of emails that have similarity in their three chosen
features. However, the list contains both benign and malicious email clusters. We needed a method
to filter out potentially malicious clusters representing the phishing campaigns. A key requirement
for the filtering process is that it must be quick and efficient to meet the real-time requirement. I
captured further tacit knowledge in the SOC that helped classify a cluster as benign.
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A cluster was considered benign if it satisfied any of the following criteria:
• All the emails in the cluster were sent to a single recipient.
• Any email in the cluster contains more than one recipient.
An attacker targeting an organization for phishing does not send multiple emails to a single
recipient in a short interval of time, since this will unlikely increase their ROI. It is hard for attackers
to create legitimate-looking emails that are sent to mutilpe recipients without knowing the social
relationships among the users. Thus phishing emails tend to have a single recipient. I would like to
emphasize that SOC analysts, including myself, were applying these heuristics in a reflexive fashion
in processing phishing incidents. It was only through the conscious externalization process (Nonaka
model) that I was able to explicate and encode these rules into PhishNet.
A few other criteria are further applied to mark a cluster as benign. My focus was on emails
containing MS Word-2003 attachments with VBA macro as the attack vector. Hence, I examine
each cluster by sampling five emails and check if they contain an embedded VBA macro. The
open-source tool mraptor [42] is used to perform this check. If at least one of the five emails does
not contain macro enabled attachments the cluster is marked as benign. I chose a sample size of
five based on experimentation; it works well given the homogeneous nature of malicious clusters.
7.7.5 IOC Extraction
I observed, from the defense’s perspective, a phishing defense solution should help analysts
quickly extract indicators of compromise (IOCs) from different campaigns. The IOCs could then be
used to generate (short-term) signatures and to identify trends in attackers’ exploits. Identifying
unique campaigns and extracting IOCs from them saves a lot of analysts’ time spent on repetitive
processing of similar campaigns.
Recall that I cluster based on three features extracted from emails but not from attachments.
The attack vector (VBA exploit) is embedded inside the attached MS-Word document. I thus
need to examine whether emails within a phishing cluster have the same VBA exploit embedded.
I manually inspected our clusters during the design phase and found that clusters that contain
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phishing emails were indeed homogeneous and contain the same VBA exploit code embedded in
them. This finding again justified the choice of the three attributes chosen for clustering.
Based on the homogeneity observation I randomly sample just one email from each malicious
cluster and extract one attachment per cluster. I then use an open-source tool olevba [43] to
extract certain keywords and IOCs from the embedded VBA macro. Output of olevba on one of
the malicious MS Word document is shown in Figure 7.6. The IOCs are written to a file and we
compute the SHA-256 hash of the IOC files generated. It was also observed that on any given run
of the algorithm, there could be multiple clusters containing the same VBA exploit (same hash
values of the olevba output) embedded in the emails. Those clusters are combined together as
a single phishing campaign. Finally, we archive the extracted IOCs (one per SHA-256 hash) for
historical trend analysis and for comparison against future campaigns.
7.8 Implementation
PhishNet is implemented as a software written in Python. I used Scikit-learn [44] implemen-
tation of K-Means algorithm for clustering. The Python program queries for emails from a Splunk
server periodically via Splunk API. The frequency of execution can be configured in a cron script.
We also display vetted phishing clusters in a web interface for usability purposes. A SOC analyst
can drill down individual clusters to view raw emails and also view extracted VBA exploit code
within their browser. The Python code and web application run on a Linux virtual machine with
dual core processor and 8 GB of RAM.
7.9 Evaluation
Emails received during the month of November 2016 were used to evaluate technical effec-
tiveness of PhishNet. I stopped tuning the algorithm’s parameters during the evaluation period.
The evaluation was performed on a real-time basis on emails with MS-Word attachments. In total,
PhishNet processed 61,215 emails for the month. It identifed six campaigns. The results were
manually verified for true and false positive rates. The tool had no knowledge of these campaigns
except for the similarity criteria for clustering and the filtering rules. The six identified campaigns
were not seen during the training period and were missed by all the signature based systems de-
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Figure 7.6: Sample IOC Output
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ployed at the SOC, except PhishNet. The false negative rate was zero as the tool did not miss any
attacks. There was only one case where the tool misclassified a cluster as a campaign. On manual
investigation the cluster was found to be a benign news article in Word format.
The most significant result was reduction in detection time for phishing emails from days
down to a few hours. The tool was configured to run the clustering algorithm on a daily basis for
experimentation purposes. The SOC is planning to configure the parameter to cluster emails on a
hourly basis for near real-time performance.
The evaluation confirms participant-observation approach to tool building for SOCs. The
approach was instrumental in identifying the key characteristics of a successful phishing detection
tool. The SOC organization’s work practices will evolve and so do the attackers’ TTPs. Operational
tools thus have to adapt. A key contribution is in showing how to develop adaptive and useful tools
for security practitioners through long-term participant observation.
7.10 Discussion
Phishing is a problem that has been well studied in research literature. Fette [45] et al.in 2007
designed a supervised machine learning approach to detect phishing emails. Their work identified
machine learning as a promising approach to detect phishing emails. The paper is technically
sound but certain assumptions do not seem to hold based on my observation of the attack trends
in the SOC we studied. A SOC is a very busy place and analysts just do not have enough time to
label data. Attackers use a myriad of attack methods, attachments being just one among them, to
compromise users and their devices. Attack techniques evolve rapidly. As a result any amount of
labeled data will not be good enough to detect new phishing emails. In fact, the SIEM solution
used in the SOC we studied was equipped with clustering algorithms. Some analysts prior to my
fieldwork tried, unsuccessfully, to use that feature to detect phishing emails.
The bottom line is that the technical aspects of phishing detection has been understood by
both researchers and practitioners for a long time, but the human component had been largely
ignored. This is not a problem of simple feature engineering that could be automated. Any defense
for a cyberthreat has operational constraints from a defense perspective. Ignoring such constraints
often renders a tool not so useful for analysts. Tacit and experiential knowledge of defenders must
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be factored into drafting tool requirements. At the same time, Understanding attackers’ constraints
and TTPs is also crucial. A successful solution for detecting suspicious events can benefit from
understanding the ROI perspective of the attacker.
A determined attacker could evade PhishNet by introducing enough noise in the three features
used in our clustering. This can be done, e.g., for spear-phishing attacks, which are much more
costly to the attacker compared with phishing campaigns. The goal of PhishNet is to effectively
identify phishing campaigns. Insights for our approach is derived from solid understanding of
phishing campaign authors’ behaviors. Heavy repackaging of exploit code and mass distribution of
phishing emails help the attackers to maximize their ROI. To evaluate robustness of our approach
we conducted experiments on emails containing other malicious attachments such as RTF and
ZIP files. We found that our clustering based on the three features are effective against those
campaigns as well. This further confirmed that repackaging is a common behavior for phishing
campaign authors and it seems that cost-effectiveness is the main reason for its wide adoption. If
PhishNet can force the adversaries to change their ROI equation, this will be a success by itself.
7.11 Take Away
This fieldwork indicates that to develop a useful security solution researchers need to access
the tacit knowledge of security operations. The proposed methodology can be used by researchers
in both academia and industry. Researchers can embed themselves or their students as analysts
in operational environments. Through apprenticeship and trust building, embedded researchers
can start to slowly absorb tacit knowledge in the environments. The captured knowledge can then
be used to build security solutions that can then be deployed and tested readily in the trench.
Cybersecurity is a highly dynamic field as human attackers constantly find ways to evade detection
systems and algorithms. Our experience indicates that only through constant interaction with
operational personnel and in situ data analysis can researchers produce useful tools. It is in this
spirit that this work provides a systematic approach to conducting such study in a security operation
environment.
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CHAPTER 8 : RUNNING AN EFFICIENT SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER
This chapter summarizes a list of recommendations for SOC analysts and managers for im-
proving efficiency of security operations. The recommendations are based on our team’s anthropo-
logical study of five different SOCs over a period of four and a half years.
8.1 Recommendation for SOC Managers
Hiring skilled analysts is an important requirement for success of an operations team. How-
ever, there is a severe shortage of skilled security analysts in the job market. As a result a SOC
manager may not be able to recruit analysts with desired a skill set. Hence the training of an
incoming analyst to adequate skill levels becomes responsibility of the manager. One way to do
this is to empower the less skilled analyst gradually to deviate from routine repetitive operational
tasks. In other words, the analyst must be allowed to deviate from standard operating procedures
(SOPs). Learning occurs only when norms are challenged. In order to perform non-routine tasks
the analyst has to get creative on the job. Use of creativity helps the analyst to accrue new skills
that they did not posses initially. With further empowerment this positive cycle can continue lead-
ing to gradual training of a novice to an expert analyst. It is important for analysts to go through
this cycle even after they have become experts in their job to avoid problems such as burnout.
The second concern for a SOC manager arises from the requirement to convey the Return
on Investment (ROI) to the parent organization. SOCs are usually looked upon as cost centers
by organizations. Ironically, if there is no malicious activity within an organization’s network the
usefulness of a SOC is questioned. Hence, a SOC manager has to periodically convey certain
metrics to the organization as part of the ROI requirement. A manager must take significant care
in selecting the metrics as it can adversely affect the analyst workforce. Metrics such as number of
tickets closed can be very appealing for the organization but often do not reflect the actual work
done on the operations floor. Time taken to triage a security alert depends on various unpredictable
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factors. A SOC analyst handling four tickets a day might actually be doing more work in comparison
with someone handling 40 tickets a day. If a SOC manager stresses on too many numerical metrics
then analysts can feel that they are not being appreciated for their effort. Documenting incident
response stories can be a meaningful metric both from analysts and management perspective. A
story starts from reception of an alert and ends with the containment and remediation steps.
Metrics based on stories can capture non-linear complexity in analysts’ tasks as well as convey ROI
to organization.
Many a times an operational tool is purchased either because of compliance reasons or it is
popular in the industry. Either way, if the tools are not helping analysts to do their job then the
SOC operations will not be efficient. SOC operational workflow evolves as the organization goes
through changes and tools have to evolve accordingly. The current method of purchasing a tool
from third party vendors is in direct contradiction to this process. A vendor creates a tool and
sells copies of the same tool to multiple SOCs agnostic to each of their workflows. Such a tool is
definitely not useful to an analyst in their daily job. Our recommendation is for SOC teams to
have in-house development teams working alongside and as analysts to develop operational tools.
From our experience this seems to be the ideal case.
8.2 Recommendation for SOC Analysts
The job of a SOC analyst has a tendency to become very repetitive very soon, sometimes
within a year. Repetition leads to boredom and eventually lack of enthusiasm that then culminates
with the analyst leaving the job. The repetition arises from the nature of work imposed upon by
SOC operations philosophy. Conventionally, SOC operations follow an SOP that dictates each step
to follow for every type of threat. While SOPs can serve as guidelines for an incoming analyst who
is a novice, it quickly becomes a limiting factor for the same analyst as he gains more experience.
The repetition though can be avoided by conscious effort by an analyst.
The key to break away from the monotonous cycle is to perform periodic reflection of daily
activities. Once repetitive parts of the job are documented analysts can script them away and focus
on more creative tasks. The nature of cyberthreats demands analysts to adapt to a highly dynamic
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adversary. As a result, a SOC analyst will always have interesting threats to triage but that can
happen only after repetitive tasks are taken care of.
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CHAPTER 9 : FIELDWORK MANUAL
This chapter provides guidelines for conducting anthropological study of SOCs for researchers.
The guidelines are based on my experiences at four different SOCs over a period of four and half
years. Any anthropological study involves the following three broad stages:
1. Data Collection
2. Data Analysis
3. Interpretation of Results
9.1 Data Collection
Observations of everyday activities are documented in a digital document. It is better to
write field notes every x hours rather than wait until the end of the day. The frequent update
ensures the observations are captured without loss of detail. While documenting the observations
caution has to be taken to be as objective as possible. The researcher must take conscious efforts to
ensure that they do not introduce any bias in their field notes. Bias can arise either due to cultural
or professional background of the researcher.
While documenting the observations the fieldworker must try to capture the intent behind
actions of participants. Initial efforts usually start with writing down literal observations but as
time progresses documentation should become semantically rich. It is also important to anonymize
names of the participants and use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the participants.
9.2 Data Analysis
Field notes can be analyzed using qualitative data analysis techniques. Qualitative methods
help a researcher to derive insights from field notes in a systematic manner. The fundamental
objective of the analysis process is to look for patterns in field notes. Not all event sequences
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turn out to be significant. A pattern is sequence of events that occur together significant number
of times. A sequence is also considered more significant if it involves different set of participants.
Mining these patterns is a daunting task but there are established methods to conduct the analysis.
If the researcher has no preconceived knowledge about the members or events in a SOC he can
use an analysis method called grounded theory (GT) [11]. The goal of GT based analysis is to move
towards abstract theory from concrete fieldwork data. GT starts with the process of coding during
which blocks of fieldwork data are assigned abstract labels. The assigned code should capture the
intent behind the field note data rather than just being descriptive. The next step is to look for
relationship between codes. Relationship also includes cause/effect and feedback relationships. In
the end a core concern will emerge which the researcher should focus on. The researcher should also
revisit the field notes to look for more evidence supporting or refuting the core concern. Chapter 4
of this dissertation provides a concrete example of application of this technique.
Sometimes the researcher analyzing the field notes has an hypothesis or theory that explains
fully or partially the field work data. In this case the analysis starts with a predefined set of codes
associated with the theory. The codes are then assigned to blocks of fieldwork data if they deemed
to explain the events. If the code does not fit the data then the chosen theory or hypothesis did
not completely capture the data. The researcher invents new code(s) to explain the data. The
new code(s) become(s) part of list of researcher’s codes. The process is repeated until all the
fieldwork data has been code. The analysis method is called Template Analysis [24]. Section 6.5.1
of Chapter 6 discusses this technique in detail.
9.3 Interpretation
The final step for the researcher in analyzing the field notes is to interpret the findings from
the analysis stage. As Michael Agar points out in his book [46], the notion of science when it
comes to studying human beings is different from the notion in the context of natural science.
In natural science, if one repeats an experiment in exactly similar manner in another place they
are guaranteed to obtain similar results. On the contrary, human studies aim to identify various
variables that affect human behavior. If a researcher studies a different human group regarding the
same problem they are guaranteed to face similar variables but the interaction of variables might be
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different from an earlier study. This is a very important distinction to keep in mind in interpreting
results from analysis of anthropological field notes. For example, if one has to repeat the study of
burnout problem among SOC analysts they will encounter the same factors such as skills, growth,
empowerment, and creativity affecting the morale of the analysts. But the type of interaction and
feedback among the factors (variables) might differ than the findings presented in the dissertation.
The difference in interaction arises due to culture and history of the studied human population.
The goal of anthropological study and analysis is to capture the presence or lack of this variation.
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CHAPTER 10 : CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation proposes the use of long-term participant observation from cultural anthro-
pology as a research methodology to study Security Operation Centers (SOCs). A specific goal of
the research was to capture tacit operational knowledge and use it for building effective operational
tools. The four and a half year study of five different SOCs by the research team made some
unexpected interesting discoveries.
The study found existence of vicious cycles in SOC human capital management as a root
cause of analyst burnout. Further analysis of fieldwork data revealed existence of contradictions
and tensions in operational environments. Acknowledging and managing the contradictions is found
to be a prerequisite for SOC innovation. Failure to do so leads to dysfunctions in SOCs such as
burnout. The dissertation also presented an example of tacit knowledge extraction a SOC through
development of a phishing detection framework. Tacit knowledge extraction in SOCs is not a
straightforward process but one that required a through understanding of social and organizational
aspects of operations. This is a major discovery from the research team’s perspective.
Finally, the dissertation provides recommendation for SOC managers and analysts to improve
operational efficiency. A research manual for researchers interested in replicating the proposed
methodology is also provided.
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